A comparison of prebunking and debunking interventions for implied versus explicit misinformation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Psychological research has offered valuable insights into how to combat misinformation. The studies conducted to date, however, have three limitations. First, pre‐emptive (“prebunking”) and retroactive (“debunking”) interventions have mostly been examined in parallel, and thus it is unclear which of these two predominant approaches is more effective. Second, there has been a focus on misinformation that is explicitly false, but implied misinformation that uses literally true information to mislead is common in the real world. Finally, studies have relied mainly on questionnaire measures of reasoning, neglecting behavioural impacts of misinformation and interventions. To offer incremental progress towards addressing these three issues, we conducted an experiment ( N = 735) involving misinformation on fair trade. We contrasted the effectiveness of prebunking versus debunking and the impacts of implied versus explicit misinformation, and incorporated novel measures assessing consumer behaviours (i.e., willingness‐to‐pay; information seeking; online misinformation promotion) in addition to standard questionnaire measures. In general, both prebunking and debunking reduced misinformation reliance. We also found that individuals tended to rely more on explicit than implied misinformation both with and without interventions.
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Cites
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Self-citationInoculating Against Fake News About COVID-19
van der Linden, S., Roozenbeek, J., & Compton, J. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.566790 · Cited by 632
Simulation-Based Power Analysis for Factorial Analysis of Variance Designs
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Cited by
Musi, E., Carmi, E., Reed, C., Yates, S., & O’Halloran, K. (2023) · Social Media + Society · doi:10.1177/20563051221150407 · Cited by 34
Continued Influence of Misinformation and the Information Disorder
Tay, L. Q., & Ecker, U. K. H. (2025) · The Remaking of Memory in the Age of the Internet and Social Media · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197661260.003.0009 · Cited by 12
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Metadata
- Authors
- Tay, L. Q., Hurlstone, M. J., Kurz, T., & Ecker, U. K. H.
- Venue
- British Journal of Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2021-12-29
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 591-607
- ISSN
- 0007-1269 (ISSN-L)
- 2044-8295
- OpenAlex
- W4225361530
- Cited by
- 109
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 21.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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