The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment
Open accessAbstract
Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non‐moral in nature.
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Cites
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Cited by
The True Self: A Psychological Concept Distinct From the Self
Strohminger, N., Knobe, J., & Newman, G. (2017) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691616689495 · Cited by 380
Self-citationLehman, D. W., O’Connor, K., Kovács, B., & Newman, G. E. (2019) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/annals.2017.0047 · Cited by 317
Self-citationSauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
The automatic influence of advocacy on lawyers and novices
Melnikoff, D. E., & Strohminger, N. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-00943-3 · Cited by 49
Lantian, A., Boudesseul, J., & Cova, F. (2024) · AJOB Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/21507740.2024.2326923 · Cited by 18
Metadata
- Authors
- Newman, G. E., De Freitas, J., & Knobe, J.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2014-07-17
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 96-125
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W2142172437
- Cited by
- 201
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 6.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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