Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
If someone brings about an outcome without intending to, is she causally and morally responsible for it? What if she acts intentionally, but as the result of manipulation by another agent? Previous research has shown that an agent's mental states can affect attributions of causal and moral responsibility to that agent, but little is known about what effect one agent's mental states can have on attributions to another agent. In Experiment 1, we replicate findings that manipulation lowers attributions of responsibility to manipulated agents. Experiments 2–7 isolate which features of manipulation drive this effect, a crucial issue for both philosophical debates about free will and attributions of responsibility in situations involving social influence more generally. Our results suggest that “bypassing” a manipulated agent's mental states generates the greatest reduction in responsibility, and we explain our results in terms of the effects that one agent's mental states can have on the counterfactual relations between another agent and an outcome.
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Citations
Cites
Validating vignette and conjoint survey experiments against real-world behavior
Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., & Yamamoto, T. (2015) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1416587112 · Cited by 1,344
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
Cushman, F. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006 · Cited by 990 · cited 3×
“…effects of whether an agent intends her action (Experiment 3), foresees the proximal effects of her action (Experiment 4, though only for F1; see also Lagnado & Channon, 2008), and whether she intends the effects of her action (Experiments 5–7; see also Cushman, 2008; Young et al., 2007).”
BackgroundThe neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment
Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Saxe, R. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0701408104 · Cited by 625 · cited 2×
“…effects of whether an agent intends her action (Experiment 3), foresees the proximal effects of her action (Experiment 4, though only for F1; see also Lagnado & Channon, 2008), and whether she intends the effects of her action (Experiments 5–7; see also Cushman, 2008; Young et al., 2007).”
BackgroundYoung, L., Camprodon, J. A., Hauser, M., Pascual-Leone, A., & Saxe, R. (2010) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0914826107 · Cited by 584
Mele, A. R. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195305043.001.0001 · Cited by 493
Causal Responsibility and Counterfactuals
Lagnado, D. A., Gerstenberg, T., & Zultan, R. (2013) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/cogs.12054 · Cited by 191 · cited 1×
“Gerstenberg and Lagnado (2014) show that responsibility attributions depend not only on the causal relation between an agent and an outcome in the actual world, but also on that relation in other possible worlds (see also Lagnado et al., 2013).”
Background
Cited by
The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm
Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2018) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868317698288 · Cited by 659
Causal Responsibility and Robust Causation
Grinfeld, G., Lagnado, D., Gerstenberg, T., Woodward, J. F., & Usher, M. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01069 · Cited by 41
Mechanistic versus Functional Understanding
Lombrozo, T., & Wilkenfeld, D. (2019) · Varieties of Understanding · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190860974.003.0011 · Cited by 29
“…Juliet”), and this might strike us as more appropriate than a mechanistic explanation (“he went that way because he moved his muscles in such and such a way…”) precisely because it identifies the dependence relation that’s robust across irrelevant perturbations (see also Murray & Lombrozo 2017).”
BackgroundSelf-citationAgency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation
Usher, M. (2020) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12537 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- Murray, D., & Lombrozo, T.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2016-02-11
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 447-481
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W2271214800
- Cited by
- 79
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 2.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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