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The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment
Open accessAbstract
Is the basis of criminality an act that causes harm, or an act undertaken with the belief that one will cause harm? The present study takes a cognitive neuroscience approach to investigating how information about an agent's beliefs and an action's consequences contribute to moral judgment. We build on prior developmental evidence showing that these factors contribute differentially to the young child's moral judgments coupled with neurobiological evidence suggesting a role for the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) in belief attribution. Participants read vignettes in a 2 x 2 design: protagonists produced either a negative or neutral outcome based on the belief that they were causing the negative outcome ("negative" belief) or the neutral outcome ("neutral" belief). The RTPJ showed significant activation above baseline for all four conditions but was modulated by an interaction between belief and outcome. Specifically, the RTPJ response was highest for cases of attempted harm, where protagonists were condemned for actions that they believed would cause harm to others, even though the harm did not occur. The results not only suggest a general role for belief attribution during moral judgment, but also add detail to our understanding of the interaction between these processes at both the neural and behavioral levels.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
Moral judgments and right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) activity depended on an interaction between belief and outcome: attempted harm was judged as forbidden as intentional harm and produced the highest RTPJ response. The results suggest belief attribution is recruited during moral judgment, especially when condemning failed attempts to harm.
Key findings
- Behaviorally, actions with negative beliefs were judged less permissible than those with neutral beliefs (1.1 vs. 3.5; F(1,9) = 712.4, P = 7.0 × 10⁻¹⁰, partial η² = 0.99), and negative outcomes were judged less permissible than neutral outcomes (2.1 vs. 2.5; F(1,9) = 41.3, P = 1.2 × 10⁻⁴, partial η² = 0.82). A significant belief × outcome interaction emerged (F(1,9) = 21.2, P = 0.001, partial η² = 0.70): attempted harm was judged just as forbidden as intentional harm (1.1 vs. 1.2; t(9) = −1.83, adjusted P = 0.30), whereas unknowing harm was less permissible than all-neutral (3.2 vs. 3.9; t(9) = −6.03, adjusted P = 3.8 × 10⁻⁴).
- In the RTPJ, the belief × outcome interaction was significant (F(1,9) = 8.76, P = 0.02). Percent signal change was higher for negative than neutral belief when the outcome was neutral (0.61 vs. 0.27; t(9) = 2.81, P = 0.02) but not when the outcome was negative (0.25 vs. 0.28; t(9) = 0.42, P = 0.68). Attempted harm produced significantly greater RTPJ response than unknowing harm (t(9) = 3.27, adjusted P = 0.02) and intentional harm (t(9) = 4.09, adjusted P = 0.006).
- Similar interactions appeared in other theory-of-mind regions: PC (F(1,9) = 12.05, P = 0.007), LTPJ (F(1,7) = 19.54, P = 0.003), and dMPFC (F(1,8) = 13.88, P = 0.01); mMPFC and vMPFC showed nonsignificant trends. Control regions in intraparietal sulcus and frontal eye fields showed robust responses but no significant main effects or interactions.
- Experiment 2 replicated the RTPJ pattern in 17 new subjects (interaction F(1,14) = 10.14, P = 0.007; attempted harm PSC higher than any other condition, P < 0.05). Combining both experiments (n = 25) yielded a significant belief × outcome interaction (F(1,9) = 18.14, P = 3.0 × 10⁻⁴).
Methods
- Participants read vignettes in a 2 × 2 design: protagonists produced either a negative outcome (someone’s death) or a neutral outcome (no death) based on either a negative belief (they believed they were causing the negative outcome) or a neutral belief. Participants judged moral permissibility on a four-point scale from 1 (completely forbidden) to 4 (completely permissible).
- Exp. 1 included 10 naive right-handed subjects (Harvard College undergraduates, aged 18–22 years, six women), native English speakers, scanned at 3 T. Exp. 2 replicated the study in 17 new subjects. Stimuli were four variations of 12 scenarios, totaling 48 stories, averaging 86 words per story.
- Regions of interest (RTPJ, LTPJ, PC, MPFC) were defined by contrasting belief stories with photo stories in a localizer task; control regions (IPS, FEF) were defined by photo stories versus rest. Percent signal change was analyzed with 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs, with whole-brain random-effects analyses at P < 0.001 uncorrected, k ≥ 10.
Limitations
- The paper states no limitations in the provided text.
- Evident from the text: samples were small (Exp. 1 n = 10; Exp. 2 n = 17) and restricted to right-handed native English-speaking Harvard undergraduates aged 18–22, limiting generalizability.
- Evident from the text: whole-brain analyses used an uncorrected threshold (P < 0.001, k ≥ 10), and the study uses hypothetical vignettes and correlational BOLD measures, so causal claims about brain regions and real-world moral judgment are not established.
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In the paper
“All of these regions have been implicated in cognitive conflict associated with moral dilemmas (6), specifically where subjects endorse emotionally salient harmful acts to prevent greater harm.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [6] source
The Results report increased activity in the DLPFC, inferior parietal lobes, and ACC during difficult personal moral dilemmas. The Discussion describes these dilemmas as cases where a personal moral violation could achieve a greater good, and links cognitive control to utilitarian judgments that favor such violations despite an opposing emotional response. Page numbers are not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.91)
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In the paper
“The interpretation we offer here is compatible with the significant developmental literature showing that young chil- dren's moral judgments are determined primarily by information about the outcomes of actions rather than the intentions of the actor (13, 16, 19).”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [13] source
- Partly supportedcites [16] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Motives-Based Moral Reasoning section reports Piaget’s finding that children under eight or nine focused more on damage than intention, and Yuill’s finding that outcomes outweighed motives for three- and five-year-olds. But it also says Piaget’s conclusion was questioned on methodological grounds and cites studies in which four- and five-year-olds judged intentionality when damage was held constant or intentions were highlighted. The unqualified claim that young children’s judgments are primarily determined by outcomes overstates this mixed account; page numbers were not provided. (LLM, conf=0.88)
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In the paper
“These studies suggest that regions in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) are re- cruited for processing stimuli that visually depict or verbally describe moral violations.”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [6] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results (page unavailable) report greater medial prefrontal cortex activity during personal moral judgment, and the Experimental Design (page unavailable) says the dilemmas were presented as text describing scenarios. This supports the part about verbal descriptions of moral violations. The paper does not report testing stimuli that visually depict violations; its visual display showed text, not depictions. (LLM, conf=0.87)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [26] source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [27] source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [28] source
- Supportedcites [29] source
The “Specific effects of processing moral stimuli” section reports increased medial orbitofrontal and medial frontal activation while participants viewed moral scenes. The “Moral emotion, moral judgment, and moral behavior” section also reports a previous study in which judging written statements with moral content, including a statement about breaking the law, activated frontopolar cortex. The source thus supports the sentence’s qualified claim about visual and verbal stimuli, though the verbal finding is from a study it reports rather than its own experiment. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [30] source
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In the paper
“As children mature, they become progressively more likely to make the opposite judgment (11, 14–19).”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [11] source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [14] source
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The Motives-Based Moral Reasoning section says children’s evaluations of intentional versus unintentional behavior become increasingly differentiated with age. It also describes a shift from judging by damage caused toward judging by intentionality, while noting that children as young as four or five can use intention when the task makes it clear. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Not matchedcites [17]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
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In the paper
“When the protagonist believed she would not harm someone but in fact did (''unknowing harm''), her action was less permis- sible than a neutral action; when the protagonist believed she would harm someone but failed (attempted harm), her action was just as forbidden as if she had succeeded.”
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Claims other papers make about this one
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In the citing paper
“In particular, the right TPJ (RTPJ) shows increased metabolic activity whenever participants read about a person's beliefs in nonmoral (5–8) and moral (9) contexts.”
From Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments (2010) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“As Saxe and her colleagues have demonstrated, in the neuroscience area, the ability to focus on intentions is potentially contingent on activation in the Right Temporo-Parietal Junction (RTPJ) (L. Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010; L. Young, et al., 2007).”
From The accidental transgressor: Morally-relevant theory of mind (2011) · cites this paper as L. Young, et al., 2007
In the citing paper
“Activity in the RTPJ while participants make moral judgments about attempted and accidental harms shows the same asymmetry: greater activity for attempted than accidental harms (9, 10, 24, 25).”
From Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments (2010) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“The enhanced RTPJ response for attempted harms at the time of judgment appears to reflect enhanced mental state processing for negative moral judgments that rely exclusively on mental state information (9, 10)”
From Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments (2010) · cites this paper as [9]
In the citing paper
“Moral judgments of these scenarios are determined primarily by the belief (9, 10).”
From Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments (2010) · cites this paper as [9]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
“Combining the RTPJ data from both experiments in a 2 � 2 � 2 ANOVA including gender as a factor, we found no significant main effect or interaction for gender. As in each experiment independently, the belief by outcome interaction in the whole sample (n � 25) was significant [F(1,9) � 18.14; P � 3.0 � 10�4].”
Reported 9 · recomputed 23
Citations
Cites
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Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
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The Moral Judgment Of The Child
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The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027 · Cited by 2,620
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Saxe, R., & Kanwisher, N. (2003) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/s1053-8119(03)00230-1 · Cited by 2,316
Self-citationDamage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05631 · Cited by 1,545
Self-citationImpairment of social and moral behavior related to early damage in human prefrontal cortex
Anderson, S. W., Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (1999) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/14833 · Cited by 1,539
Other minds in the brain: a functional imaging study of “theory of mind” in story comprehension.
Fletcher, P. (1995) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00692-r · Cited by 1,522
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- DE Brown Human Universals (McGraw–Hill, New York, 1991).
- MD Hauser Moral Minds: How Nature Designed a Universal Sense of Right and Wrong (HarperCollins, New York, 2006).
- JM Darley, MP Zanna Am Sci 70, 515–521 (1982).
Cited by
The Social Brain: Neural Basis of Social Knowledge
Adolphs, R. (2009) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163514 · Cited by 1,827
“Theory-of-mind tasks, which ask subjects to reason about the intentions and beliefs of others, activate medial prefrontal cortex and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ).”
InfluentialFractionating theory of mind: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies
Schurz, M., Radua, J., Aichhorn, M., Richlan, F., & Perner, J. (2014) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.01.009 · Cited by 1,656
Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05631 · Cited by 1,545
Self-citationUnderstanding others' actions and goals by mirror and mentalizing systems: a meta-analysis
Van Overwalle, F., & Baetens, K. (2009) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.06.009 · Cited by 1,329
Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
Cushman, F. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006 · Cited by 990
“One source of evidence for competition between distinct processes comes from functional neuroimaging ( Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007 ).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Saxe, R.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- *Department of Psychology and
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2007-05-15
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 20
- Pages
- 8235-8240
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC1895935
- OpenAlex
- W2108251530
- Semantic Scholar
- 2d49e18f41d4c0d14a610691a054c978365c056d
- Cited by
- 625
- References
- 58
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 52 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 36 · 2020: 33 · 2019: 44 · 2018: 36 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 32 · 2015: 37 · 2014: 31 · 2013: 34 · 2012: 37
- FWCI
- 13.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Keywords
- theory of mind, moral judgment, belief attribution, right temporoparietal junction, criminality, moral condemnation, neural basis of morality
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Behavior, Culture, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Mental Processes, Models, Psychological, Morals, Nervous System Physiological Phenomena, Parietal Lobe
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