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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 58 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 5 of the 34 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment

Open access
Young, Liane, Cushman, Fiery, Hauser, Marc, Saxe, Rebecca · 2007 · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Abstract

Is the basis of criminality an act that causes harm, or an act undertaken with the belief that one will cause harm? The present study takes a cognitive neuroscience approach to investigating how information about an agent's beliefs and an action's consequences contribute to moral judgment. We build on prior developmental evidence showing that these factors contribute differentially to the young child's moral judgments coupled with neurobiological evidence suggesting a role for the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) in belief attribution. Participants read vignettes in a 2 x 2 design: protagonists produced either a negative or neutral outcome based on the belief that they were causing the negative outcome ("negative" belief) or the neutral outcome ("neutral" belief). The RTPJ showed significant activation above baseline for all four conditions but was modulated by an interaction between belief and outcome. Specifically, the RTPJ response was highest for cases of attempted harm, where protagonists were condemned for actions that they believed would cause harm to others, even though the harm did not occur. The results not only suggest a general role for belief attribution during moral judgment, but also add detail to our understanding of the interaction between these processes at both the neural and behavioral levels.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

Moral judgments and right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) activity depended on an interaction between belief and outcome: attempted harm was judged as forbidden as intentional harm and produced the highest RTPJ response. The results suggest belief attribution is recruited during moral judgment, especially when condemning failed attempts to harm.

Key findings

  • Behaviorally, actions with negative beliefs were judged less permissible than those with neutral beliefs (1.1 vs. 3.5; F(1,9) = 712.4, P = 7.0 × 10⁻¹⁰, partial η² = 0.99), and negative outcomes were judged less permissible than neutral outcomes (2.1 vs. 2.5; F(1,9) = 41.3, P = 1.2 × 10⁻⁴, partial η² = 0.82). A significant belief × outcome interaction emerged (F(1,9) = 21.2, P = 0.001, partial η² = 0.70): attempted harm was judged just as forbidden as intentional harm (1.1 vs. 1.2; t(9) = −1.83, adjusted P = 0.30), whereas unknowing harm was less permissible than all-neutral (3.2 vs. 3.9; t(9) = −6.03, adjusted P = 3.8 × 10⁻⁴).
  • In the RTPJ, the belief × outcome interaction was significant (F(1,9) = 8.76, P = 0.02). Percent signal change was higher for negative than neutral belief when the outcome was neutral (0.61 vs. 0.27; t(9) = 2.81, P = 0.02) but not when the outcome was negative (0.25 vs. 0.28; t(9) = 0.42, P = 0.68). Attempted harm produced significantly greater RTPJ response than unknowing harm (t(9) = 3.27, adjusted P = 0.02) and intentional harm (t(9) = 4.09, adjusted P = 0.006).
  • Similar interactions appeared in other theory-of-mind regions: PC (F(1,9) = 12.05, P = 0.007), LTPJ (F(1,7) = 19.54, P = 0.003), and dMPFC (F(1,8) = 13.88, P = 0.01); mMPFC and vMPFC showed nonsignificant trends. Control regions in intraparietal sulcus and frontal eye fields showed robust responses but no significant main effects or interactions.
  • Experiment 2 replicated the RTPJ pattern in 17 new subjects (interaction F(1,14) = 10.14, P = 0.007; attempted harm PSC higher than any other condition, P < 0.05). Combining both experiments (n = 25) yielded a significant belief × outcome interaction (F(1,9) = 18.14, P = 3.0 × 10⁻⁴).

Methods

  • Participants read vignettes in a 2 × 2 design: protagonists produced either a negative outcome (someone’s death) or a neutral outcome (no death) based on either a negative belief (they believed they were causing the negative outcome) or a neutral belief. Participants judged moral permissibility on a four-point scale from 1 (completely forbidden) to 4 (completely permissible).
  • Exp. 1 included 10 naive right-handed subjects (Harvard College undergraduates, aged 18–22 years, six women), native English speakers, scanned at 3 T. Exp. 2 replicated the study in 17 new subjects. Stimuli were four variations of 12 scenarios, totaling 48 stories, averaging 86 words per story.
  • Regions of interest (RTPJ, LTPJ, PC, MPFC) were defined by contrasting belief stories with photo stories in a localizer task; control regions (IPS, FEF) were defined by photo stories versus rest. Percent signal change was analyzed with 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs, with whole-brain random-effects analyses at P < 0.001 uncorrected, k ≥ 10.

Limitations

  • The paper states no limitations in the provided text.
  • Evident from the text: samples were small (Exp. 1 n = 10; Exp. 2 n = 17) and restricted to right-handed native English-speaking Harvard undergraduates aged 18–22, limiting generalizability.
  • Evident from the text: whole-brain analyses used an uncorrected threshold (P < 0.001, k ≥ 10), and the study uses hypothetical vignettes and correlational BOLD measures, so causal claims about brain regions and real-world moral judgment are not established.

Model-written summary of a shortened version of the paper’s full text (it is longer than we read). Check it against the paper before relying on it.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.0701408104

Cites

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. DE Brown Human Universals (McGraw–Hill, New York, 1991).
  2. MD Hauser Moral Minds: How Nature Designed a Universal Sense of Right and Wrong (HarperCollins, New York, 2006).
  3. JM Darley, MP Zanna Am Sci 70, 515–521 (1982).

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Metadata

Authors
Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Saxe, R.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • *Department of Psychology and
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2007-05-15
Volume
104
Issue
20
Pages
8235-8240
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W2108251530
Cited by
625
References
58
Citations by year
2026: 19 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 52 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 36 · 2020: 33 · 2019: 44 · 2018: 36 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 32 · 2015: 37 · 2014: 31 · 2013: 34 · 2012: 37
FWCI
13.64
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
Keywords
theory of mind, moral judgment, belief attribution, right temporoparietal junction, criminality, moral condemnation, neural basis of morality
MeSH terms
Adult, Behavior, Culture, Female, Humans, Judgment, Male, Mental Processes, Models, Psychological, Morals, Nervous System Physiological Phenomena, Parietal Lobe

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1073/pnas.0701408104
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Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Saxe, R. (2007). The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0701408104

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