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Cited by 44Child and Animal Learning DevelopmentAutism Spectrum Disorder ResearchSocial Robot Interaction and HRI

Children with autism can track others' beliefs in a competitive game

Peterson, Candida C., Slaughter, Virginia, Peterson, James, Premack, David·2013·Developmental Science
DOI 10.1111/desc.12040
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Abstract

Theory of mind (ToM) development, assessed via ‘litmus’ false belief tests, is severely delayed in autism, but the standard testing procedure may underestimate these children's genuine understanding. To explore this, we developed a novel test involving competition to win a reward as the motive for tracking other players' beliefs (the ‘Dot‐Midge task’). Ninety‐six children, including 23 with autism (mean age: 10.36 years), 50 typically developing 4‐year‐olds (mean age: 4.40) and 23 typically developing 3‐year‐olds (mean age: 3.59) took a standard ‘Sally‐Ann’ false belief test, the Dot‐Midge task (which was closely matched to the Sally‐Ann task procedure) and a norm‐referenced verbal ability test. Results revealed that, of the children with autism, 74% passed the Dot‐Midge task, yet only 13% passed the standard Sally‐Ann procedure. A similar pattern of performance was observed in the older, but not the younger, typically developing control groups. This finding demonstrates that many children with autism who fail motivationally barren standard false belief tests can spontaneously use ToM to track their social partners’ beliefs in the context of a competitive game.

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Crossref · 10.1111/desc.12040

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  • Autistic individuals can theorise about other minds, and this ability is dependent on cognitive ability, task demands, and whether automatic or conscious Theory of Mind is being tested.

    “research has shown that autistic individuals can theorise about other minds, and this ability is dependent on cognitive ability (Bowler 1992), task demands (Peterson et al. 2013) and whether automatic or conscious Theory of Mind is being tested (Senju et al. 2009).”

    From Experiences of autism acceptance and mental health in autistic adults (2018) · cites this paper as Peterson et al. 2013

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Authors
Peterson, C. C., Slaughter, V., Peterson, J., & Premack, D.
Affiliations
  • The University of Queensland (AU)
  • University of Pennsylvania (US)
Corresponding author
Peterson, Candida C.
ORCID
Venue
Developmental Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2013-03-19
Volume
16
Issue
3
Pages
443-450
ISSN
  • 1363-755X (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-7687
DOI
10.1111/desc.12040
OpenAlex
W1970895520
Cited by
44
References
29
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2023: 3 · 2021: 17 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 2
FWCI
8.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
  • Developmental Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Autism Spectrum Disorder Research
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
Keywords
autism spectrum disorder, theory of mind, false belief understanding, competitive games, social cognition, children, verbal ability
MeSH terms
Adolescent, Autistic Disorder, Child, Child, Preschool, Culture, Games, Experimental, Humans, Social Perception, Theory of Mind

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