The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
From Standpoint Epistemology to Epistemic Oppression
Abstract
Standpoint epistemology is committed to a cluster of views that pays special attention to the role of social identity in knowledge‐acquisition. Of particular interest here is the situated knowledge thesis. This thesis holds that for certain propositions p, whether an epistemic agent is in a position to know that p depends on some nonepistemic facts related to the epistemic agent's social identity. In this article, I examine two possible ways to interpret this thesis. My first goal here is to clarify existing interpretations of this thesis that appear in the literature but that are undeveloped and often mistakenly conflated. In so doing, I aim to make clear the different versions of standpoint epistemology that one might accept and defend. This project is of significance, I argue, because standpoint epistemology provides helpful tools for understanding a phenomenon of recent interest: epistemic oppression. My second goal is to provide an analysis that makes clear how each of the readings I put forth can be used to illuminate forms of epistemic oppression.
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Cites
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color
Crenshaw, K. (1991) · Stanford Law Review · doi:10.2307/1229039 · Cited by 32,792
Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective
Haraway, D. (1988) · Feminist Studies · doi:10.2307/3178066 · Cited by 18,364
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198
Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought
Collins, P. H. (1986) · Social Problems · doi:10.2307/800672 · Cited by 3,536 · cited 2×
“Defenses of the epistemic privilege thesis can be found in Hartsock 1983; Collins 1986; Wylie 2003; and Rolin 2009.”
BackgroundThe Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling
Hochschild, A. R. (2012) · doi:10.1525/9780520951853 · Cited by 3,236
Toward a feminist theory of the state
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Why So Slow?: The Advancement of Women
Valian, V. (1999) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/7235.001.0001 · Cited by 1,252
Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression
Dotson, K. (2014) · Social Epistemology · doi:10.1080/02691728.2013.782585 · Cited by 1,232
A Cautionary Tale: On Limiting Epistemic Oppression
Dotson, K. (2012) · Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies · doi:10.1353/fro.2012.a472779 · Cited by 874
Faculty Service Loads and Gender: Are Women Taking Care of the Academic Family?
Guarino, C. M., & Borden, V. M. H. (2017) · Research in Higher Education · doi:10.1007/s11162-017-9454-2 · Cited by 791
Cited by
Positionality and Its Problems: Questioning the Value of Reflexivity Statements in Research
Savolainen, J., Casey, P. J., McBrayer, J. P., & Schwerdtle, P. N. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916221144988 · Cited by 148
Is there an epistemic advantage to being oppressed?
Dror, L. (2023) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12424 · Cited by 78
Standpoint Epistemology and Epistemic Peerhood: A Defense of Epistemic Privilege
TOOLE, B. (2024) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2023.6 · Cited by 42
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Toole, B.
- Venue
- Hypatia
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 598-618
- ISSN
- 0887-5367 (ISSN-L)
- 1527-2001
- OpenAlex
- W2972945067
- Cited by
- 181
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 28.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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