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Cited by 78Feminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPhilosophical Ethics and Theory

Is there an epistemic advantage to being oppressed?

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Dror, Lidal·2023·Noûs
DOI 10.1111/nous.12424
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Abstract

Do the oppressed have an epistemic advantage when it comes to knowing about the systems that oppress them? If so, what explains this advantage? In this paper, I consider whether an epistemic advantage can be derived from the oppressed's contingent tendency to have more relevant experiences and motivation than the non‐oppressed; or, alternatively, whether an advantage derives from the oppressed's very lived experience, thus being in principle unavailable to the non‐oppressed. I then explore the potential role of knowledge‐how for explaining an epistemic advantage. Ultimately, I conclude that the oppressed tend to have a contingent advantage, while rejecting that they have one in principle, except for when their phenomenological experience has an effect on the veracity of the claims they make. This has the important upshot that privileged people are not epistemically disadvantaged in principle and are thus often blameworthy for their ignorance about oppression.

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  • Personal experience may also give them an epistemic advantage with unique understanding and insights.

    “However, on the flip side, their personal experience may also give them an epistemic advantage with unique understanding and insights (L. Dror, 2022).”

    From Biased and biasing: the hidden bias cascade and bias snowball effects (2025) · cites this paper as L. Dror, 2022

    Section 2.2 says oppressed people can have more informative experiences and resources for understanding social marginalization, supporting a possible epistemic advantage from personal experience. But the paper rejects an advantage that is inherently unavailable to others; it does not generally support the claim that their understanding and insights are unique (Abstract; §2.2). Page numbers are not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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Authors
Dror, L.
Affiliations
Princeton University (US)
Corresponding author
Dror, Lidal
ORCID
Dror, Lidal
Venue
Noûs
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2022-06-23
Volume
57
Issue
3
Pages
618-640
ISSN
  • 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0068
DOI
10.1111/nous.12424
OpenAlex
W4283370030
Cited by
78
References
8
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 16
FWCI
23.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
Noûs (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Keywords
epistemic advantage, oppression, epistemic privilege, know-how, lived experience, phenomenology, ignorance, epistemic injustice, epistemic motivation

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