The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market
Abstract
Why do some parties fail to benefit from patronage in pork‐ridden political systems? This article analyzes the interaction between patronage and partisanship to explain why some incumbents are more likely to benefit from pork politics than others. We explain such differences by focusing on political parties' access to resources (supply side) and voters' dependence on fiscal largesse (demand side). We show how these differences affect the patron's choice of public sector wages and employment. We use subnational level data to show different electoral returns from patronage for the two major political coalitions in Argentina—Peronism and the UCR‐Alianza—and their effect on preferences over public sector wages and employment.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261013 · Cited by 5,485
Distributive Politics and Economic Growth
Alesina, A., & Rodrik, D. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118470 · Cited by 4,406
“Effective” Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe
Laakso, M., & Taagepera, R. (1979) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/001041407901200101 · Cited by 3,439
Partisan Politics in the Global Economy
Garrett, G. (1998) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625633 · Cited by 1,873
Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game
Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (1986) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.2307/2131098 · Cited by 1,274
Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy
Alesina, A., & Rosenthal, H. (1995) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511720512 · Cited by 1,201
IVERSEN, T., & SOSKICE, D. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062083 · Cited by 1,175
Equality, Employment, and Budgetary Restraint: The Trilemma of the Service Economy
Iversen, T., & Wren, A. (1998) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s0043887100007358 · Cited by 989
Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution
Moene, K. O., & Wallerstein, M. (2001) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400400067 · Cited by 817
The Value of a Vote: Malapportionment in Comparative Perspective
Samuels, D., & Snyder, R. (2001) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123401000254 · Cited by 495
Cited by
Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina
STOKES, S. C. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051683 · Cited by 1,586
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics
(2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566020.001.0001 · Cited by 1,320
Hicken, A. (2011) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220508 · Cited by 832
The Political Economy of Clientelism*
Robinson, J. A., & Verdier, T. (2013) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/sjoe.12010 · Cited by 554
Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua
Gonzalez‐Ocantos, E., de Jonge, C. K., Meléndez, C., Osorio, J., & Nickerson, D. W. (2012) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00540.x · Cited by 498
Metadata
- Authors
- Calvo, E., & Murillo, M. V.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-09-07
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 742-757
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2124298601
- Cited by
- 690
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 75.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00099.x
- The paper
- Calvo, E., & Murillo, M. V. (2004). Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00099.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.