The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Political Economy of Clientelism*
Open accessAbstract
In this paper, we argue that the political‐commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form, particularly employment in the public sector. A job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents (such as in situations with moral hazard), and employment is optimal ex post. Moreover, a job is selective and reversible, and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician. We show that the need to make offers of employment incentive‐compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods. We also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity. Inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high, when inequality is high, and when money matters less than ideology in politics.
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Cites
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Bratton, M., & Walle, N. V. D. (1997) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174657 · Cited by 1,838
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555136 · Cited by 1,649
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
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Explaining Interethnic Cooperation
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (1996) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2945838 · Cited by 1,606
Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina
STOKES, S. C. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051683 · Cited by 1,586
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Cited by
What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism
Weitz‐Shapiro, R. (2012) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00578.x · Cited by 395
Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa
Vicente, P. C. (2014) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12086 · Cited by 365
Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes
Mares, I., & Young, L. (2016) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-060514-120923 · Cited by 332
The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear
Padró i Miquel, G. (2007) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00455.x · Cited by 308
Clientelism in Indian Villages
Anderson, S., Francois, P., & Kotwal, A. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130623 · Cited by 240
Metadata
- Authors
- Robinson, J. A., & Verdier, T.
- Venue
- The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-04
- Volume
- 115
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 260-291
- ISSN
- 0347-0520 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9442
- OpenAlex
- W2148228039
- Cited by
- 554
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 84.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
