The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
So How Does the Mind Work?
Open accessAbstract
In my book How the Mind Works, I defended the theory that the human mind is a naturally selected system of organs of computation. Jerry Fodor claims that ‘the mind doesn’t work that way’(in a book with that title) because (1) Turing Machines cannot duplicate humans’ ability to perform abduction (inference to the best explanation); (2) though a massively modular system could succeed at abduction, such a system is implausible on other grounds; and (3) evolution adds nothing to our understanding of the mind. In this review I show that these arguments are flawed. First, my claim that the mind is a computational system is different from the claim Fodor attacks (that the mind has the architecture of a Turing Machine); therefore the practical limitations of Turing Machines are irrelevant. Second, Fodor identifies abduction with the cumulative accomplishments of the scientific community over millennia. This is very different from the accomplishments of human common sense, so the supposed gap between human cognition and computational models may be illusory. Third, my claim about biological specialization, as seen in organ systems, is distinct from Fodor's own notion of encapsulated modules, so the limitations of the latter are irrelevant. Fourth, Fodor's arguments dismissing of the relevance of evolution to psychology are unsound.
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Cites
I.—COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE
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“I will assume that the arguments Fodor has in mind come from Turing's 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence' (Turing, 1950) and Quine's 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (Quine, 1960).”
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Cited by
Darwin's mistake: Explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds
Penn, D. C., Holyoak, K. J., & Povinelli, D. J. (2008) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x08003543 · Cited by 1,174
Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate.
Barrett, H. C., & Kurzban, R. (2006) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.113.3.628 · Cited by 785
LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited
Fodor, J. A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.001.0001 · Cited by 590
The Evolution of Cognitive Bias
Haselton, M. G., Nettle, D., & Andrews, P. W. (2015) · The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1002/9780470939376.ch25 · Cited by 472
Adaptive rationality: an evolutionary perspective on cognitive bias
Haselton, M. G., Bryant, G. A., Wilke, A., Frederick, D. A., Galperin, A., Frankenhuis, W. E., & Moore, T. (2009) · Social Cognition · doi:10.1521/soco.2009.27.5.733 · Cited by 222
Metadata
- Authors
- Pinker, S.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-02
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-24
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W2121673078
- Cited by
- 232
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 16.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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