Cited by 222Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsEvolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Adaptive rationality: an evolutionary perspective on cognitive bias

Haselton, Martie G., Bryant, Gregory A., Wilke, Andreas, Frederick, David A., Galperin, Andrew, Frankenhuis, Willem E., Moore, Tyler·2009·Social Cognition

Abstract

A casual look at the literature in social cognition reveals a vast collection of biases, errors, violations of rational choice, and failures to maximize utility. One is tempted to draw the conclusion that the human mind is woefully muddled. We present a three-category evolutionary taxonomy of evidence of biases: biases are (a) heuristics, (b) error management effects, or (c) experimental artifacts. We conclude that much of the research on cognitive biases can be profitably reframed and understood in evolutionary terms. An adaptationist perspective suggests that the mind is remarkably well designed for important problems of survival and reproduction, and not fundamentally irrational. Our analysis is not an apologia intended to place the rational mind on a pedestal for admiration. Rather, it promises practical outcomes including a clearer view of the architecture of systems for judgment and decision making, and exposure of clashes between adaptations designed for the ancestral past and the demands of the present.

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Crossref · 10.1521/soco.2009.27.5.733

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  • Cognitive biases can be caused by a mismatch between evolutionarily rationalized heuristics and the current context or environment.

    “Cognitive biases can be caused by a mismatch between evolutionarily rationalized “heuristics” (“evolutionary rationality”: Haselton et al., 2009) and the current context or environment (Tooby and Cosmides, 2005).”

    From Human- versus Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as Haselton et al., 2009

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Authors
Haselton, M. G., Bryant, G. A., Wilke, A., Frederick, D. A., Galperin, A., Frankenhuis, W. E., & Moore, T.
Affiliations
  • University of California, Los Angeles (US)
  • Max Planck Society (DE)
Venue
Social Cognition
Published
2009-10
Volume
27
Issue
5
Pages
733-763
ISSN
0278-016X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2171950188
Cited by
222
References
147
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 17 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 11
FWCI
4.87
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Social Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • Chapman University Digital Commons (Chapman University) (submittedVersion)
  • Utrecht University Repository (Utrecht University) (submittedVersion)
  • Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
  • Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
  • Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Keywords
cognitive biases, adaptive rationality, evolutionary psychology, heuristics, error management, experimental artifacts, rational choice, judgment and decision making, adaptationism, cognitive architecture, utility maximization

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