The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi‐task Principal–Agent Model
Open accessAbstract
This paper reports on a two‐task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece‐rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece‐rate contracts. Many principals reward high effort on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high effort on both tasks. In contrast, almost all agents with a piece‐rate contract focus on the first task and disregard the second. Principals understand this and predominantly offer bonus contracts. This behavior contradicts the self‐interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness.
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Cites
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Self-citationChoosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M.
- Venue
- The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-10
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 453-474
- ISSN
- 0347-0520 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9442
- OpenAlex
- W2954281079
- Cited by
- 253
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 45.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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