The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Experts' agency problems: evidence from the prescription drug market in Japan
Open accessAbstract
This article examines the physician‐patient agency relationship in the context of the prescription drug market in Japan. In this market, physicians often both prescribe and dispense drugs and can pocket profits in so doing. A concern is that, due to the incentive created by the markup, physicians' prescription decisions may be distorted. Empirical results using anti‐hypertensive drugs suggest that physicians' prescription choices are influenced by the markup. However, physicians are also sensitive to the patient's out‐of‐pocket costs. Overall, although the markup affects prescription choices, physicians appear more responsive to the patient's out‐of‐pocket costs than their own profits from markup.
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Cites
Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. H. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171753 · Cited by 7,081
Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. (1994) · doi:10.3386/t0151 · Cited by 5,302 · cited 1×
“Also, the first-stage F-statistic is 65, which is substantially higher than the minimum F-statistics standard of 10 proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997). These statistics suggest that these instruments are reasonable.”
Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud
Darby, M. R., & Karni, E. (1973) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466756 · Cited by 3,947
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Cited by
Uncertainty and Learning in Pharmaceutical Demand
Crawford, G. S., & Shum, M. (2005) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00612.x · Cited by 433
Dulleck, U., Kerschbamer, R., & Sutter, M. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.2.526 · Cited by 346
Metadata
- Authors
- Iizuka, T.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-09
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 844-862
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-2171
- OpenAlex
- W1972889257
- Cited by
- 192
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 18.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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