Cited by 68Memory Processes and InfluencesMemory and Neural MechanismsPhilosophy and Theoretical Science

Does metarepresentation make human mental time travel unique?

Redshaw, Jonathan·2014·WIREs Cognitive Science

Abstract

Recent neurological evidence suggests that rats can mentally represent novel spatial trajectories and then are more likely to follow these paths in the future. Consequently, it has been proposed that human and nonhuman mental time travel capacities may differ in degree rather than kind. As of yet, however, there is no evidence for the crucial and qualitatively distinct component of metarepresentation in any nonhuman animal, not even our closest great ape relatives. Metarepresentation allows humans to represent the relationship between current reality and mere representations of reality—including those of the future. Drawing on parallels with dreaming and mind‐wandering, I outline the future‐oriented benefits associated with uncontextualized (non‐metarepresentational) representations of past and novel events, but propose that further, immense benefits flowed from the addition of metarepresentational insight. I critique previous behavioral paradigms used to assess mental time travel in animals and suggest how future‐oriented metarepresentation might possibly be demonstrated nonverbally. WIREs Cogn Sci 2014, 5:519–531. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1308 This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Evolutionary Roots of Cognition Psychology > Comparative Psychology Psychology > Memory

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Crossref · 10.1002/wcs.1308

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  • Both the caching and previous future planning paradigms have been criticized for not showing evidence of true foresight as seen in humans, or have failed to replicate.

    “both this and the previous paradigm have been criticized for not showing evidence of true foresight as seen in humans [164,165], or have failed to replicate [166].”

    From Is episodic-like memory <i>like</i> episodic memory? (2024) · cites this paper as [164]

  • Overall, the strongest evidence that currently exists for future planning in non-human animals comes from corvids, which were also the original animal models for episodic-like memory.

    “the strongest evidence that exists currently [50,164] comes from corvids who were also the original animal models for episodic-like memory [52]”

    From Is episodic-like memory <i>like</i> episodic memory? (2024) · cites this paper as [164]

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Authors
Redshaw, J.
Affiliations
The University of Queensland (AU)
Corresponding author
Redshaw, Jonathan
Venue
WIREs Cognitive Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2014-08-13
Volume
5
Issue
5
Pages
519-531
ISSN
  • 1939-5078 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-5086
OpenAlex
W2101548183
Cited by
68
References
114
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 3
FWCI
2.42
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory and Neural Mechanisms
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
mental time travel, metarepresentation, rats, spatial navigation, dreams, mind wandering, animal cognition, future-oriented cognition, great apes

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