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Cited by 467

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 72 of the 72 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Board Structure, Ownership, and Voluntary Disclosure in Ireland

Donnelly, Ray, Mulcahy, Mark·2008·Corporate Governance: An International Review

Abstract

Manuscript Type:Empirical Research Question/Issue:This is a cross‐sectional study of the relation between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in Ireland. Research Findings/Results:We report clear evidence that voluntary disclosure increases with the number of nonexecutive directors on the board. Firms that have a nonexecutive chairman make greater voluntary disclosures than other firms. This finding is not robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables. We find no evidence that ownership structure is related to voluntary disclosure. Theoretical Implications:The results regarding nonexecutive directors are interpreted as independent boards facilitating a reduction in information asymmetry between owners and managers. While this supports the predictions of agency theory, the absence of evidence that ownership structure influences voluntary disclosure does not. It is posited that sociological and organizational factors (e.g., informal networking) that pervade the Irish market mitigate against our disclosure measure capturing all aspects of voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, indirect evidence is provided that there are other costs and benefits to disclosure that vary across firms and may outweigh agency costs in many situations. We conclude that while agency theory has some explanatory power for voluntary disclosure, it cannot explain all the cross‐sectional differences in voluntary disclosure by Irish public limited companies. Practical Implications:The results support the attention paid by regulators to the proportion of nonexecutive directors on the board. However, the costs and benefits to disclosure vary across firms. Regardless of agency considerations and regulatory guidelines, firms will ultimately formulate their disclosure policy with reference to overall marginal costs and marginal benefits.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00692.x

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Metadata

Authors
Donnelly, R., & Mulcahy, M.
Venue
Corporate Governance: An International Review
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2008-09
Volume
16
Issue
5
Pages
416-429
ISSN
  • 0964-8410 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-8683
OpenAlex
W1992437542
Cited by
467
References
72
FWCI
21.94
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Board Structure, Ownership, and Voluntary Disclosure in Ireland. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00692.x
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Donnelly, R., & Mulcahy, M. (2008). Board Structure, Ownership, and Voluntary Disclosure in Ireland. Corporate Governance: An International Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00692.x

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