Affective polarization in crosscutting communication networks: Offline and online evidence from Spain

“…social psychologists have pointed out that the processing of counter-attitudinal information is cognitively and emotionally challenging, and that it may activate biased information processing that reinforces prejudice and polarization (Festinger, 1954; Druckman and McGrath, 2019; Little, 2019).”

“…processing For centuries, scholars from various schools of thought have highlighted political talk in the informal public sphere, and especially communication between citizens whose political views differ, as one of the core elements of democratic life (Manin, 1987; Habermas, 1989; Mutz, 2002).”

“One of the major benefits of panel data vis-à-vis crosssectional data is the possibility of retrieving within-unit estimates (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Bell et al., 2018).”

“The tendency known as motivated reasoning, for instance, is a dissonance-reduction strategy whereby people inadvertently use various self-serving strategies to conclude what they wish to arrive at, even when faced with balanced arguments for and against (Kunda, 1990).”

“One of the major benefits of panel data vis-à-vis crosssectional data is the possibility of retrieving within-unit estimates (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Bell et al., 2018).”

“, 2015), and attitude reinforcement (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Karlsen et al., 2017; Bail et al., 2018).”

“In this paper, I focus on one potential source of affective polarization frequently featured in both academic and popular debate—namely the communication that flows horizontally between citizens in their informal social networks and the extent to which they comprise dissenting perspectives and opinions (Iyengar et al.…”

“Up until now, studies focusing on the situation in the United States have contributed significantly to the body of knowledge about affective polarization (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2012, 2019; Garrett et al., 2014; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Mason, 2015, 2016; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Druckman and Levendusky, 2019;…”

“With regard to empirical research, evidence of a “backfire effect” (Bail et al., 2018) associated with counter-attitudinal information has been mixed.”

“More specifically, empirical research has revealed links between crosscutting communication and both attitude moderation (e.g., Mutz, 2002, 2006; Parsons, 2010; Lee et al., 2015), and attitude reinforcement (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Karlsen et al., 2017; Bail et al., 2018).”

“Contrary to popular belief, a sizable body of empirical research has repeatedly discovered that people unintentionally come across more crosscutting information on online platforms like social media than they do in their face-to-face networks (Wojcieszak and Mutz, 2009; Barberá et al., 2015; O’Hara and Stevens, 2015;…”

“Several meta-analyses have concluded that both direct and indirect contacts between out-group members tend to be associated with less prejudiced attitudes (Tropp and Pettigrew, 2006; Pettigrew et al., 2011; Lemmer and Wagner, 2015; Dovidio et al., 2017).”

“…in the United States have contributed significantly to the body of knowledge about affective polarization (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2012, 2019; Garrett et al., 2014; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Mason, 2015, 2016; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Druckman and Levendusky, 2019; Druckman et al., 2021).”

“Previous studies have proposed reasons including heightened ideological sorting (Mason, 2016; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016), a political and high-choice media environment (Berry and Sobieraj, 2013; Del Vicario et al., 2016; Lelkes et al., 2017; Tucker et al., 2018; Iyengar et al., 2019), as well as negative campaign…”

“Although social grouping is instinctive according to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Huddy, 2001; Hogg, 2018), social grouping, and homophily can be troublesome for societal and political relations.”

“This finding is noteworthy because it contradicts a widespread assumption in the popular and scholarly discourse that online networks tend to be characterized overwhelmingly by opinion homophily—not least on social media (Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2018)—and it agrees with studies that have challenged this notion (Duboi…”

“While there is empirical evidence to back up these notions, there have also been findings that call for cautiousness in prematurely interpreting all these factors as major culprits behind surges in affective polarization (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010; Prior, 2013; Nordbrandt, 2021b; Lorenzo-Rodríguez and Torcal, 2022; T…”

“One of the major benefits of panel data vis-à-vis crosssectional data is the possibility of retrieving within-unit estimates (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Bell et al., 2018).”

“…processing For centuries, scholars from various schools of thought have highlighted political talk in the informal public sphere, and especially communication between citizens whose political views differ, as one of the core elements of democratic life (Manin, 1987; Habermas, 1989; Mutz, 2002).”

“Exposure to a diversity of perspectives has been considered important to counter polarization (Sunstein, 2002) and prejudice (Allport, 1954), and to promote intergroup tolerance (Mutz, 2002), and well-reflected political views (Arendt, 1968; Manin, 1987; Habermas, 1989).”

“Scholars like Sunstein (2002) and others (e.g., Isenberg, 1986; Farrar et al., 2009), argue that information sharing in politically homogeneous groups of likeminded people can cause attitudes to shift toward the extreme because of the social comparison and confirmation bias that such a form of…”

“, 2019), eroding trust in democratic institutions (Torcal and Carty, 2022), and leading to the legitimization of autocratic tendencies to keep mistrusted groups away from political influence (Garrett et al., 2014; Mason, 2016; McCoy et al., 2018).”

“Frontiers in Political Science 04 frontiersin.org A long line of scholars has instead assigned crosscutting communication great value as a potential antidote to the problematic sides of social homophily (e.g., Mill, 1859; Arendt, 1968; Manin, 1987; Habermas, 1989; Mutz, 2002).”

“Several meta-analyses have concluded that both direct and indirect contacts between out-group members tend to be associated with less prejudiced attitudes (Tropp and Pettigrew, 2006; Pettigrew et al., 2011; Lemmer and Wagner, 2015; Dovidio et al., 2017).”

“Such a model effectively removes all potential bias from the residual that reflects the correlation between the predictors and the past values of the dependent variable (Beck and Katz, 2011).”

“This may lead the group members to converge toward opinions that are more extreme than they were initially and sharply at odds with those held by out-groups, or to engage in “othering” of out-group members (Spivak, 1985).”

“However, social psychologists have pointed out that the processing of counter-attitudinal information is cognitively and emotionally challenging, and that it may activate biased information processing that reinforces prejudice and polarization (Festinger, 1954; Druckman and McGrath, 2019; Little, 2019).”

“Empirical research has connected exposure to online rudeness to decreased political trust, and the polarization of thought (Anderson et al., 2014; Borah, 2014; Lyons and Veenstra, 2016).”

“Some more recent studies have however, indicated that the positive effects of intergroup contact is less generic than previously assumed and that they may depend on some scope conditions (Dinesen et al., 2019; Paluck et al., 2019).”

“Contrary to popular belief, a sizable body of empirical research has repeatedly discovered that people unintentionally come across more crosscutting information on online platforms like social media than they do in their face-to-face networks (Wojcieszak and Mutz, 2009; Barberá et al., 2015; O’Hara and Stevens, 2015;…”

“, 2018; Kim, 2019) and attenuated (e.g., Parsons, 2010; Barberá, 2015; Beam et al., 2018; Druckman and Levendusky, 2019; Guess and Coppock, 2020; Levendusky and Stecula, 2021; Padró-Solanet and Balcells, 2022) levels of polarization linked to crosscutting communication in studies with varied designs and measurements a…”

“…category two and three into a 4 Wagner’s measure of the a ective distance from one’s most liked party bears resemblance to the measure developed by Reiljan (2020) but is specifically developed tomeasure individual-level a ective polarization rather than aggregate levels of a ective polarization.”

“Several meta-analyses have concluded that both direct and indirect contacts between out-group members tend to be associated with less prejudiced attitudes (Tropp and Pettigrew, 2006; Pettigrew et al., 2011; Lemmer and Wagner, 2015; Dovidio et al., 2017).”

“Up until now, studies focusing on the situation in the United States have contributed significantly to the body of knowledge about affective polarization (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2012, 2019; Garrett et al., 2014; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Mason, 2015, 2016; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Druckman and Levendusky, 2019;…”

“It further considers the frequent clustering of parties into blocks in multiparty systems whereby individuals’ feelings may follow a corresponding block structure (Wagner, 2021; Torcal and Comellas, 2022).”

“Third, the study contributes to the growing comparative research agenda on affective polarization polarization (Gidron et al., 2020; Reiljan, 2020; Boxell et al., 2022), by zooming in on Spain at an interesting point in time—namely, the 6 months preceding the 2018–2019 election year.”

“Previous studies have proposed reasons including heightened ideological sorting (Mason, 2016; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016), a political and high-choice media environment (Berry and Sobieraj, 2013; Del Vicario et al., 2016; Lelkes et al., 2017; Tucker et al., 2018; Iyengar et al., 2019), as well as negative campaign…”

“, 2015); an increased propensity to adjust opinions when faced with persuasive arguments (Levitan and Visser, 2008; Himmelroos and Christensen, 2020); awareness of multiple rationales (Cappella et al., 2002; Price et al., 2002; Nir, 2005); more public-minded attitudes (Nordbrandt, 2021a); and greater tolerance toward…”

“Up until now, studies focusing on the situation in the United States have contributed significantly to the body of knowledge about affective polarization (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2012, 2019; Garrett et al., 2014; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Mason, 2015, 2016; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Druckman and Levendusky, 2019;…”

“Third, the study contributes to the growing comparative research agenda on affective polarization polarization (Gidron et al., 2020; Reiljan, 2020; Boxell et al., 2022), by zooming in on Spain at an interesting point in time—namely, the 6 months preceding the 2018–2019 election year.”

“Results from a study by Barabas (2004) suggest that the risk of backlash is higher in colloquial, non-moderated, communicative settings compared to discussion settings where deliberative norms such as civility and respectfulness are encouraged, such as deliberative forums.”

“Several meta-analyses have concluded that both direct and indirect contacts between out-group members tend to be associated with less prejudiced attitudes (Tropp and Pettigrew, 2006; Pettigrew et al., 2011; Lemmer and Wagner, 2015; Dovidio et al., 2017).”

“From a social identity perspective, affective polarization may intensify as party identities become increasingly salient whereby more people divide the world into a liked and trusted political in-group and a disliked and distrusted political out-group (Mason, 2015, 2016).”

“, 2018; Kim, 2019) and attenuated (e.g., Parsons, 2010; Barberá, 2015; Beam et al., 2018; Druckman and Levendusky, 2019; Guess and Coppock, 2020; Levendusky and Stecula, 2021; Padró-Solanet and Balcells, 2022) levels of polarization linked to crosscutting communication in studies with varied designs and measurements a…”

“Up until now, studies focusing on the situation in the United States have contributed significantly to the body of knowledge about affective polarization (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2012, 2019; Garrett et al., 2014; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Mason, 2015, 2016; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Druckman and Levendusky, 2019;…”

“…standards of decency are more easily violated than they do in networks that enable face-toface interaction, and online communication frequently elicits more unpleasant feelings than in-real-life (IRL) interaction environment (Rowe, 2015; Bail et al., 2018; Theocharis et al., 2020, p. 2).”

“This type of more effortful processing of information where individuals take both new and old as well as pro and con arguments into consideration, is here referred to as deliberative information processing (Mercier and Landemore, 2012).”

“When political topics come up online, it is easier to be a passive observer (Lieberman and Schroeder, 2020).”

“Contrary to popular belief, a sizable body of empirical research has repeatedly discovered that people unintentionally come across more crosscutting information on online platforms like social media than they do in their face-to-face networks (Wojcieszak and Mutz, 2009; Barberá et al., 2015; O’Hara and Stevens, 2015;…”

“Previous studies have proposed reasons including heightened ideological sorting (Mason, 2016; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016), a political and high-choice media environment (Berry and Sobieraj, 2013; Del Vicario et al., 2016; Lelkes et al., 2017; Tucker et al., 2018; Iyengar et al., 2019), as well as negative campaign…”

“Some more recent studies have however, indicated that the positive effects of intergroup contact is less generic than previously assumed and that they may depend on some scope conditions (Dinesen et al., 2019; Paluck et al., 2019).”

“Moreover, a limited number of studies hitherto (Wojcieszak and Price, 2010; Baek et al., 2012; Strandberg et al., 2019; Fletcher et al., 2020) have contrasted the attitudinal implications of offline and online communication within the same study, let alone with identical measures, hampering the possibilities for fruit…”

“Empirical research has connected exposure to online rudeness to decreased political trust, and the polarization of thought (Anderson et al., 2014; Borah, 2014; Lyons and Veenstra, 2016).”

“, 2015); an increased propensity to adjust opinions when faced with persuasive arguments (Levitan and Visser, 2008; Himmelroos and Christensen, 2020); awareness of multiple rationales (Cappella et al., 2002; Price et al., 2002; Nir, 2005); more public-minded attitudes (Nordbrandt, 2021a); and greater tolerance toward…”

“Contrary to popular belief, a sizable body of empirical research has repeatedly discovered that people unintentionally come across more crosscutting information on online platforms like social media than they do in their face-to-face networks (Wojcieszak and Mutz, 2009; Barberá et al., 2015; O’Hara and Stevens, 2015;…”

“, 2009), argue that information sharing in politically homogeneous groups of likeminded people can cause attitudes to shift toward the extreme because of the social comparison and confirmation bias that such a form of communication can provoke (e.g., Binder et al., 2009; Grönlund et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2015).”

“Simultaneously, scholars often assume that norms such as respectfulness and reciprocity are important for realizing deliberative as opposed to biased information processing (Baek et al., 2012; Chen and Lu, 2017; Pew Research Center, 2020).”

“, Barberá, 2015; Levendusky and Stecula, 2021; PadróSolanet and Balcells, 2022), and still, other pieces of evidence are based on experimental manipulation of crosscutting exposure or discussion (e.g., Taber and Lodge, 2006; Wojcieszak and Price, 2010; Karlsen et al., 2017; Bail et al., 2018; Druckman and Levendusky,…”

“In this paper, I focus on one potential source of affective polarization frequently featured in both academic and popular debate—namely the communication that flows horizontally between citizens in their informal social networks and the extent to which they comprise dissenting perspectives and opinions (Iyengar et al.…”

“Contrary to popular belief, a sizable body of empirical research has repeatedly discovered that people unintentionally come across more crosscutting information on online platforms like social media than they do in their face-to-face networks (Wojcieszak and Mutz, 2009; Barberá et al., 2015; O’Hara and Stevens, 2015;…”

“Like other recent studies (Harteveld, 2021; Torcal and Comellas, 2022), the measure of affective polarization employed in this study is based on Wagner’s (2021) individual-level “Affective polarization index” (API).”

“Some evidence is derived from self-reported perceptions of exposure or discussion (e.g., Parsons, 2010; Garrett et al., 2014; Kim, 2015, 2019), other studies track actual exposure (e.g., Barberá, 2015; Levendusky and Stecula, 2021; PadróSolanet and Balcells, 2022), and still, other pieces of…”

“Third, the study contributes to the growing comparative research agenda on affective polarization polarization (Gidron et al., 2020; Reiljan, 2020; Boxell et al., 2022), by zooming in on Spain at an interesting point in time—namely, the 6 months preceding the 2018–2019 election year.”

“, 2019), as well as negative campaign advertising and stereotypes (Sood and Iyengar, 2016).”

“To signal their belonging to the group, they tend to adjust the attitudes they express to align with what they perceive to be the dominant position of the group, and/or to express these attitudes in a manner more antagonistic to the members of other groups (Isenberg, 1986; Sunstein, 2002; Farrar et al., 2009).”

“, 2015); an increased propensity to adjust opinions when faced with persuasive arguments (Levitan and Visser, 2008; Himmelroos and Christensen, 2020); awareness of multiple rationales (Cappella et al.”

“I refer to the communication that occurs between citizens with various political voting preferences as crosscutting communication, in keeping with earlier studies (e.g., Mutz, 2002, 2006; Lee et al., 2015; Matthes et al., 2019).”

“, Barberá, 2015; Levendusky and Stecula, 2021; PadróSolanet and Balcells, 2022), and still, other pieces of evidence are based on experimental manipulation of crosscutting exposure or discussion (e.g., Taber and Lodge, 2006; Wojcieszak and Price, 2010; Karlsen et al., 2017; Bail et al., 2018; Druckman and Levendusky,…”

“All the models isolated the relationship between education and income—variables that tend to correlate strongly with many other attitudinal and behavioral variables (Jeynes, 2002).”

“These include depolarized emotions (Parsons, 2010; Levendusky and Stecula, 2021); reflection from different standpoints (Lee et al., 2015); an increased propensity to adjust opinions when faced with persuasive arguments (Levitan and Visser, 2008; Himmelroos and Christensen, 2020); awareness of…”

“More specifically, empirical research has revealed links between crosscutting communication and both attitude moderation (e.g., Mutz, 2002, 2006; Parsons, 2010; Lee et al., 2015), and attitude reinforcement (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Karlsen et al.”

“…social psychologists have pointed out that the processing of counter-attitudinal information is cognitively and emotionally challenging, and that it may activate biased information processing that reinforces prejudice and polarization (Festinger, 1954; Druckman and McGrath, 2019; Little, 2019).”

“Some evidence is derived from self-reported perceptions of exposure or discussion (e.g., Parsons, 2010; Garrett et al., 2014; Kim, 2015, 2019), other studies track actual exposure (e.g., Barberá, 2015; Levendusky and Stecula, 2021; PadróSolanet and Balcells, 2022), and still, other pieces of…”

“Empirical research has connected exposure to online rudeness to decreased political trust, and the polarization of thought (Anderson et al., 2014; Borah, 2014; Lyons and Veenstra, 2016).”

“…and lay sectors that social media, in particular, and online communication, in general, may exacerbate polarization in society (Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2018)—empirical studies have reached different conclusions (Kubin and von Sikorski, 2021; Nordbrandt, 2021b; LorenzoRodríguez and Torcal, 2022).”

“, 2018; Kim, 2019) and attenuated (e.g., Parsons, 2010; Barberá, 2015; Beam et al., 2018; Druckman and Levendusky, 2019; Guess and Coppock, 2020; Levendusky and Stecula, 2021; Padró-Solanet and Balcells, 2022) levels of polarization linked to crosscutting communication in studies with varied designs and measurements a…”

“This finding is noteworthy because it contradicts a widespread assumption in the popular and scholarly discourse that online networks tend to be characterized overwhelmingly by opinion homophily—not least on social media (Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2018)—and it agrees with studies that have challenged this notion (Duboi…”

“While there is empirical evidence to back up these notions, there have also been findings that call for cautiousness in prematurely interpreting all these factors as major culprits behind surges in affective polarization (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010; Prior, 2013; Nordbrandt, 2021b; Lorenzo-Rodríguez and Torcal, 2022; T…”

“Although social grouping is instinctive according to social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Huddy, 2001; Hogg, 2018), social grouping, and homophily can be troublesome for societal and political relations.”

“1: when replying to people closer to them in a network (e.g., a retweet network), users express more positive emotions, but when replying to those who are farther away, they express more negative emotions and toxicity.”

“Information is a basic need for everyone, both for personal development and their social environment (Nordbrandt 2022).”

“En tercer lugar, los efectos del consumo trans-versal y contractitudinal deliberado o accidental pueden ser despolarizantes (Beam, Hutchens y Hmielowski, 2018; Kelly et al. , 2014; Nordbrandt, 2022).”

“There are practically no studies that would aim to directly compare affective polarization in the digital and traditional environments (with a few exceptions — [Baek, Wojcieszak, Delli Carpini 2012; Nordbrandt 2022]).”