The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Article Commentary: Judgment and Decision Making: A Personal View
Abstract
The large number of textbooks recently published identifies the field of judgment and decision making as one of the areas of psychology in which research activity grew most rapidly during the past two decades. The enthusiasm is easily explained: The topic has much to make it appealing to investigators. Its focus is a large puzzle that will not go away—a search for the bounds of human rationahty. It includes a deep normative theory that offers criteria for rational action. It is also rich in amusing anecdotes and challenging brain teasers. The study of judgment and choice occasionally sheds light on events in the real world, including the decisions of world leaders, the foibles of the market and the pitfalls of medical diagnosis. The doubts that psychologists have raised about the rationality of human agents are having a modest effect on neighboring disciplines, such as economics and political science, in which the assumption of human rationality is often used to predict the outcomes of competitive interaction. The detailed study of bounded rationality also has implications for the human engineering of information systems, decision aids and organizational procedures. The following observations sketch a personal view of this exciting field, its history, accomphshments and limitations, and possible future.
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Cites
Illusion and well‐being: A social psychological perspective on mental health
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.103.2.193 · Cited by 7,814
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Kuznets, S. (2024) · Business Cycle Theory, Part I Volume 4 · doi:10.4324/9781003549741-8 · Cited by 7,176
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.1.193 · Cited by 5,019
Self-citationAnomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation
Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (1992) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118482 · Cited by 2,305
Contingent weighting in judgment and choice.
Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P. (1988) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.95.3.371 · Cited by 1,567
(2025) · Principles of Behavioral Economics · doi:10.1017/9781009422314.012 · Cited by 1,290
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How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life
Gilovich, T. D. (1991) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 990
Costs and benefits of judgment errors: Implications for debiasing.
Arkes, H. R. (1991) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.110.3.486 · Cited by 764
Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation
Neale, M. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (1991) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 632
Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Self-citationRepresentativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Self-citationSlovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence
Griffin, D., & Tversky, A. (1992) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(92)90013-r · Cited by 1,841
Metadata
- Authors
- Kahneman, D.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1991-05
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 142-145
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2147010344
- Cited by
- 298
- References
- 15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.