Are Morally Motivated Decision Makers Insensitive to the Consequences of Their Choices?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Is morally motivated decision making different from other kinds of decision making? There is evidence that when people have sacred or protected values (PVs), they reject trade-offs for secular values (e.g., “You can't put a price on a human life”) and tend to employ deontological rather than consequentialist decision principles. People motivated by PVs appear to show quantity in-sensitivity. That is, in trade-off situations, they are less sensitive to the consequences of their choices than are people without PVs. The current study examined the relation between PVs and quantity insensitivity using two methods of preference assessment: In one design, previous results were replicated; in a second, PVs were related to increased quantity sensitivity. These and other findings call into question important presumed properties of PVs, suggesting that how PVs affect willingness to make tradeoffs depends on where attention is focused, a factor that varies substantially across contexts.
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Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Tetlock, P. E., Kristel, O. V., Elson, S. B., Green, M. C., & Lerner, J. S. (2000) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.78.5.853 · Cited by 1,400
Thinking the unthinkable: sacred values and taboo cognitions
Tetlock, P. E. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00135-9 · Cited by 915
Reluctance to vaccinate: Omission bias and ambiguity
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Cited by
Mindful Judgment and Decision Making
Weber, E. U., & Johnson, E. J. (2009) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163633 · Cited by 745
Action, Outcome, and Value: A Dual-System Framework for Morality
Cushman, F. (2013) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868313495594 · Cited by 473
Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making
Bartels, D. M. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.001 · Cited by 435
Self-citationBauman, C. W., McGraw, A. P., Bartels, D. M., & Warren, C. (2014) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12131 · Cited by 323
Self-citationThe Bias That Divides Us: The Science and Politics of Myside Thinking
Stanovich, K. E. (2021) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/13367.001.0001 · Cited by 152
Metadata
- Authors
- Bartels, D. M., & Medin, D. L.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2007-01
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 24-28
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2099463303
- Cited by
- 108
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 6.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Bartels, D. M., & Medin, D. L. (2007). Are Morally Motivated Decision Makers Insensitive to the Consequences of Their Choices? Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01843.x
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