The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear
Abstract
Autocrats in many developing countries have extracted enormous personal rents from power. In addition, they have imposed inefficient policies including pervasive patronage spending. I present a model in which the presence of ethnic identities and the absence of institutionalized succession processes allow the ruler to elicit support from a sizeable share of the population despite large reductions in welfare. The fear of falling under an equally inefficient and venal ruler that favours another group is enough to discipline supporters. The model predicts extensive use of patronage, ethnic bias in taxation, and spending patterns and unveils a new mechanism through which economic frictions translate into increased rent extraction by the leader. These predictions are consistent with the experiences of bad governance, ethnic bias, wasteful policies, and kleptocracy in post-colonial Africa.
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Cites
Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions
Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555466 · Cited by 5,649
Kuper, L., & Horowitz, D. L. (1986) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2069338 · Cited by 4,869
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510809 · Cited by 4,810
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Bucovetsky, S., Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2002) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1061733 · Cited by 3,748
Boix, C. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804960 · Cited by 2,211
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Ferejohn, J. (1986) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf00124924 · Cited by 2,161
Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument
Gerhart, G. M., Chabal, P., & Daloz, J.-P. (1999) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20049597 · Cited by 2,017
Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective
Bratton, M., & Walle, N. V. D. (1997) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174657 · Cited by 1,838
The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law
Weingast, B. R. (1997) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2952354 · Cited by 1,750
Cited by
Baland, J.-M., Moene, K. O., & Robinson, J. A. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00007-0 · Cited by 593
Gehlbach, S., & Keefer, P. (2011) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2011.04.002 · Cited by 429
The long-run effects of the scramble for Africa
Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2016) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20131311 · Cited by 424
Leader behaviour and the natural resource curse
Caselli, F., & Cunningham, T. (2009) · Oxford Economic Papers · doi:10.1093/oep/gpp023 · Cited by 187
Testa, C. (2012) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.04.005 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- Padró i Miquel, G.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-10
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1259-1274
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W3020978624
- Cited by
- 308
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 30.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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