The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games
Abstract
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate whether players' actions can be viewed as responses to underlying expectations about their opponent's behaviour. In our laboratory experiments, subjects play a set of 14 two-person 3×3 games and state beliefs about which actions they expect their opponents to play. The data sets from the two tasks are largely inconsistent. Rather, we find evidence that the subjects perceive the games differently when they (i) choose actions and (ii) state beliefs—their stated beliefs reveal deeper strategic thinking than their actions. On average, they fail to best respond to their own stated beliefs in almost half of the games. The inconsistency is confirmed by estimates of a unified statistical model that jointly uses the actions and the belief statements. There, we can control for decision noise and formulate a statistical test that rejects consistency. Effects of the belief elicitation procedure on subsequent actions are mostly insignificant.
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Cites
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Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
RABIN, M. (2011) · Advances in Behavioral Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15 · Cited by 4,705
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Calibration of probabilities: the state of the art to 1980
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A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
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Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study
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Babcock, L., Recalde, M. P., Vesterlund, L., & Weingart, L. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20141734 · Cited by 507
Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications
Crawford, V. P., Costa-Gomes, M. A., & Iriberri, N. (2013) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.51.1.5 · Cited by 505
Self-citationThe effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments
Gächter, S., & Renner, E. (2010) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9246-4 · Cited by 359
“Last-Place Aversion”: Evidence and Redistributive Implications *
Kuziemko, I., Buell, R. W., Reich, T., & Norton, M. I. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt035 · Cited by 301
Belief elicitation in experiments: is there a hedging problem?
Blanco, M., Engelmann, D., Koch, A. K., & Normann, H.-T. (2010) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-010-9249-1 · Cited by 297
Metadata
- Authors
- COSTA-GOMES, M. A., & WEIZSÄCKER, G.
- Venue
- Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-07
- Volume
- 75
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 729-762
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W3122279284
- Cited by
- 278
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 40.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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