The DOI matches its Crossref record; 66 of the 66 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non‐deterrent*
Abstract
Law backed by non‐deterrent sanctions (mild law) has been hypothesized to achieve compliance because of norm activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild law in the provision of public goods by comparing it to severe law (deterrent sanctions) and no law. The results show that exogenously imposing mild law does not achieve compliance, but compliance is much improved if mild law is endogenously chosen, i.e., self‐imposed. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to comply with the law if they expect many others to do so.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
Samuelson, P. A. (1954) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1925895 · Cited by 7,458
Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., & Kallgren, C. A. (1990) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.1015 · Cited by 5,965
Tyler, T. R. (2006) · doi:10.1515/9781400828609 · Cited by 5,156
Collective action and the evolution of social norms.
Ostrom, E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137 · Cited by 4,195
The Handbook of experimental economics
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-1645 · Cited by 3,679
The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs
Heckman, J. J., Lalonde, R. J., & Smith, J. A. (1999) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(99)03012-6 · Cited by 3,059
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00394-9 · Cited by 2,780 · cited 1×
“It has been argued that conditional cooperation is the most important cooperation norm (Ostrom 2000), and it has been found to be a robust behavioral regularity in economic experiments (Fischbacher et al. 2001, Keser and van Winden 2000).”
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
Posner, R. A. (1974) · Stanford Law Review · doi:10.2307/1227682 · Cited by 2,239
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468061 · Cited by 1,816
(1982) · The Atlantic · Cited by 1,800
ELLICKSON, R. C. (1991) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.4159/9780674036437 · Cited by 1,413
Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
Ellickson, R. C. (2009) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvk12rdz · Cited by 1,205
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
Polinsky, A. M., & Shavell, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.38.1.45 · Cited by 1,159
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992
SALLY, D. (1995) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463195007001004 · Cited by 1,126
2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Ledyard, J. O. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-004 · Cited by 1,033
Farrell, J., & Rabin, M. (1996) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.10.3.103 · Cited by 1,012
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Keser, C., & Van Winden, F. (2000) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/1467-9442.00182 · Cited by 800
On the Expressive Function of Law
Sunstein, C. R. (1996) · University of Pennsylvania Law Review · doi:10.2307/3312647 · Cited by 795 · cited 2×
“…compliance with the law (Ellickson 1991, Tyler 1990).1 In addition to the direct deterrent effects of legal sanctions, various indirect ways of how lawmaking may affect behavior have been suggested (Cooter 1998, McAdams 2000a, Posner 1998, 2000, Posner and Rasmusen 1999, Sunstein 1996, 1999).”
Liberman, V., Samuels, S. M., & Ross, L. (2004) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167204264004 · Cited by 671 · cited 1×
“Cookson (2000) and Liberman et al. (2004) show that framing can affect contributions to public goods in some contexts but Abbink and Henning-Schmidt (2002) find no such effect in a “bribery game”.”
Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook
(1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511664458 · Cited by 578
Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out
Cardenas, J. C., Stranlund, J., & Willis, C. (2000) · World Development · doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(00)00055-3 · Cited by 559
POSNER, E. A. (2009) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv2d7x4q8 · Cited by 532
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement
Anderson, E. S., & Pildes, R. H. (2000) · University of Pennsylvania Law Review · doi:10.2307/3312748 · Cited by 492 · cited 1×
“However, the relevance of norm-mediated effects of lawmaking (“expressive law”) is contested (e.g. Adler 2000, Anderson and Pildes 2000, Scott 2000).”
Cooter, R. (1998) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468036 · Cited by 481
Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in South India
Bardhan, P. (2000) · Economic Development and Cultural Change · doi:10.1086/452480 · Cited by 445
Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions
Rasmusen, E., & Posner, R. A. (2000) · bepress Legal Repository · Cited by 443
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics
Korobkin, R. B., & Ulen, T. S. (2000) · California Law Review · doi:10.2307/3481255 · Cited by 436
The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of a Legal System
Raz, J. (1980) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198253631.001.0001 · Cited by 423
Cialdini, R. B., & Kenrick, D. T. (1976) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.34.5.907 · Cited by 408
(1994) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-25646-4 · Cited by 405
Brown, R. W. (1965) · Cited by 398
More order with less law: On contract enforcement, trust and crowding
Bohnet, I., Frey, B. S., & Huck, S. (2001) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055401000211 · Cited by 391 · cited 2×
“Depending on the framing, a (monetary) sanction may be perceived as a legitimate response to unacceptable behavior or as the price to pay for acceptable behavior (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, Bohnet et al. 2001, Fehr and Gächter 2001).”
The police and neighborhood safety Broken Windows
Wilson, J. Q., & Kelling, G. L. (2017) · Social, Ecological and Environmental Theories of Crime · doi:10.4324/9781315087863-11 · Cited by 344
Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment
Abbink, K., & Hennig-Schmidt, H. (2006) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-5385-z · Cited by 281
A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law
McAdams, R. H. (2000) · Virginia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1073827 · Cited by 260
Cooter, R. (1984) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1122472 · Cited by 257
Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games
Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2000) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/bf01669197 · Cited by 255
Referendums around the World: The Growing Use of Direct Democracy
Fukuyama, F., Butler, D., & Ranney, A. (1995) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20047139 · Cited by 251
Lessig, L. (1998) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468039 · Cited by 249
Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation?
Fehr, E., & G�chter, S. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.229047 · Cited by 244
Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments
Cookson, R. (2000) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/bf01669207 · Cited by 243
Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law
Posner, E. A. (1998) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468042 · Cited by 209
Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem
Kahan, D. M. (2000) · The University of Chicago Law Review · doi:10.2307/1600336 · Cited by 194
Marks, M. L., Mirvis, P. H., Hackett, E. J., & Grady, J. F. (1986) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037//0021-9010.71.1.61 · Cited by 185
Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games
Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2000) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1023/a:1009962612354 · Cited by 176
Voting when money and morals conflict: an experimental test of expressive voting
Tyran, J.-R. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(03)00016-1 · Cited by 173
Self-citationExpressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview
Adler, M. D. (2000) · University of Pennsylvania Law Review · doi:10.2307/3312747 · Cited by 166
Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime
Kahan, D. M. (1998) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468037 · Cited by 147
An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive LawPreprint
McAdams, R. H. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.253331 · Cited by 125
DO WE PUNISH HIGH INCOME CRIMINALS TOO HEAVILY?
Lott, J. R. (1992) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01283.x · Cited by 123
Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent
McEwen, C. A., & Maiman, R. J. (1984) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/3053479 · Cited by 119
Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games
Weber, R. A., Camerer, C. F., & Knez, M. (2003) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1023/a:1026257921046 · Cited by 117
Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary CooperationPreprint
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2001) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 98
Field and laboratory studies of littering
Krauss, R. M., Freedman, J. L., & Whitcup, M. (1978) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/0022-1031(78)90064-1 · Cited by 95
The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms
Scott, R. E. (2000) · Virginia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1073826 · Cited by 94
DO People Want Optimal Deterrence?
Sunstein, C. R., Schkade, D. A., & Kahneman, D. J. (2000) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468069 · Cited by 87
Does conviction have a persistent effect on income and employment?
Waldfogel, J. (1994) · International Review of Law and Economics · doi:10.1016/0144-8188(94)90039-6 · Cited by 74
Behavioral law and economics: a progress report
Sunstein, C. R. (1999) · American Law and Economics Review · doi:10.1093/aler/1.1.115 · Cited by 67
Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?Preprint
Bohnet, I., & Cooter, R. D. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.452420 · Cited by 62
Huck, S. (1998) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023399 · Cited by 50
Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public GoodsPreprint
Tyran, J., & Feld, L. P. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.290231 · Cited by 48
Self-citationSmith, E. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2000) · Cited by 46
Economic theories of the state
Hardin, R. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511664458.003 · Cited by 41
Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalizing Legal ValuesPreprint
Cooter, R. D. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.229950 · Cited by 16
Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?
Cooter, R. D., & Bohnet, I. (2001) · Cited by 16
Cited by
Alesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2015) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.53.4.898 · Cited by 1,475
Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?
Bowles, S., & Polanía-Reyes, S. (2012) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.50.2.368 · Cited by 917
Reward, punishment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis.
Balliet, D., Mulder, L. B., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2011) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0023489 · Cited by 720
Institution Formation in Public Goods Games
Kosfeld, M., Okada, A., & Riedl, A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1335 · Cited by 373
Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy
Bó, P. D., Foster, A., & Putterman, L. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.5.2205 · Cited by 372
Metadata
- Authors
- Tyran, J., & Feld, L. P.
- Venue
- The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-03
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 135-156
- ISSN
- 0347-0520 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9442
- OpenAlex
- W2164552964
- Cited by
- 418
- References
- 66
- FWCI
- 34.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.