The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Distribution of probability assessments for almanac and future event questions
Abstract
This study examines the distribution and calibration of probability assessments given to general knowledge questions and question concerning future events. Two experiments revealed that: (1) People use certainty responses less frequently in response to questions concerning then‐future events than to general knowledge questions even when the then‐future event questions are easier than the general knowledge questions. (2) Indonesian students previously thought to have little grasp of probabilistic thinking, are able to give realistic probability assessments for then‐future events. Cultural and task influences on our findings are discussed in relation to a procedural model of the processes involved in answering a question. We conclude that, as most applications of decision analysis involve future uncertainty, research in probability assessment should concentrate on questions concerning future events rather than on general knowledge questions.
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Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
Koriat, A., Lichtenstein, S., & Fischhoff, B. (1980) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.6.2.107 · Cited by 1,477
Cultural differences in probabilistic thinking
Wright, G. N., Phillips, L. D., Whalley, P. C., Choo, G. T., Ng, K.-O., Tan, I., & Wisudha, A. (1978) · Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology · doi:10.1177/002202217893002 · Cited by 168
Self-citation
Cited by
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Metadata
- Authors
- WRIGHT, G., & WISUDHA, A.
- Venue
- Scandinavian Journal of Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1982-09
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 219-224
- ISSN
- 0036-5564 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9450
- OpenAlex
- W2000991723
- Cited by
- 109
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 1.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- WRIGHT, G., & WISUDHA, A. (1982). Distribution of probability assessments for almanac and future event questions. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9450.1982.tb00435.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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