Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper aims to show that widespread, serious errors in the self‐assessment of affect are a genuine possibility—one worth taking very seriously. For we are subject to a variety of errors concerning the character of our present and past affective states, or “affective ignorance.” For example, some affects, particularly moods, can greatly affect the quality of our experience even when we are unable to discern them. I note several implications of these arguments. First, we may be less competent pursuers of happiness than is commonly believed, raising difficult questions for political thought. Second, some of the errors discussed ramify for our understanding of consciousness, including Ned Block's controversial distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Third, empirical results based on self‐reports about affect may be systematically misleading in certain ways.
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Citations
Cites
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Ecological momentary assessment
Shiffman, S., Stone, A. A., & Hufford, M. R. (2008) · Annual Review of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.3.022806.091415 · Cited by 6,454
The unbearable automaticity of being
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Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364 · cited 1×
“think that divergence is rare, and possibly nonexistent (Block 1995; but see his 2005).”
BackgroundGorillas in our midst: sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events
Simons, D. J., & Chabris, C. F. (1999) · Perception · doi:10.1068/p281059 · Cited by 3,181
Beyond money: toward an economy of well-being
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Assessing Subjective Well-Being: Progress and Opportunities
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Happiness Is a Stochastic Phenomenon
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Will Money Increase Subjective Well-Being?
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Cited by
Who knows what about a person? The self–other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model.
Vazire, S. (2010) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0017908 · Cited by 1,080
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection
Schwitzgebel, E. (2008) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-037 · Cited by 658
Jayawickreme, E., Forgeard, M. J. C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2012) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0027990 · Cited by 341
“Schwarz and Strack (1991) argued that how individuals rate life satisfaction depends on the information that is conscious, and this information could be heavily influenced by framing effects and mood (see also Haybron, 2007).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Haybron, D. M.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-08-20
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 394-428
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W1977276885
- Cited by
- 93
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 4.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Haybron, D. M. (2007). Do We Know How Happy We Are? On Some Limits of Affective Introspection and Recall. Noûs. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00653.x
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.