The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
Abstract
We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for noncredible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.
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Citations
Cites
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Cited by
Repeated Games and Reputations
Mailath, G. J., & Samuelson, L. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001 · Cited by 810
Self-citationTrust in Forecast Information Sharing
Özer, Ö., Zheng, Y., & Chen, K.-Y. (2011) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1334 · Cited by 421
Designing reputation mechanisms
Dellarocas, C., Dini, F., & Spagnolo, G. (2006) · Handbook of Procurement · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511492556.019 · Cited by 44
Metadata
- Authors
- Cripps, M. W., Mailath, G. J., & Samuelson, L.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2004-03
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 407-432
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W3123307456
- Cited by
- 195
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 12.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.