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POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS ON CORRUPTION: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS

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ALT, JAMES E., LASSEN, DAVID D. · 2008 · Economics & Politics
Cited by 138

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under a divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that a divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under a unified government, where the government cannot control itself.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x

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Metadata

Authors
ALT, J. E., & LASSEN, D. D.
Venue
Economics & Politics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2007-09-14
Volume
20
Issue
1
Pages
33-61
ISSN
  • 0954-1985 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0343
OpenAlex
W3123558137
Cited by
138
References
3
FWCI
18.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS ON CORRUPTION: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x
The paper
ALT, J. E., & LASSEN, D. D. (2008). POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL CHECKS ON CORRUPTION: EVIDENCE FROM AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS. Economics & Politics. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2007.00319.x

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.