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Politician control, agency problems and ownership reform: Evidence from China*
Open accessAbstract
Using data from a recent national survey on the ownership reform of state‐owned enterprises in China, we study the effects of reducing politician control and agency problems on a number of reform outcomes. Taking into account the endogenous nature of the reform, we find that these outcome measures of the reform's success are positively affected by the lessening of politician control through increasing the firm's flexibility in labour deployment and by the mitigation of agency costs through the introduction of more effective corporate governance mechanisms such as one‐share one‐vote and shareholding‐based board structure composition. Ownership structure also matters: relative to shareholding by the state, foreign ownership has a positive effect on reform outcomes; individual (mostly employee) shareholding has a negative or insignificant effect. Somewhat surprisingly, operating autonomy (excluding labour deployment flexibility) has a negative effect on firm performance, suggesting serious agency problems in the reformed enterprises.
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Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. H. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171753 · Cited by 7,081
Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. (1994) · doi:10.3386/t0151 · Cited by 5,302 · cited 1×
“Another important condition for good instrumental variables is that they have good explanatory power for the endogenous variables (Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997).”
Bound, J., Jaeger, D. A., & Baker, R. M. (1995) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2291055 · Cited by 1,018
Cited by
Agency theory: Review of Theory and Evidence on Problems and Perspectives
Panda, B., & Leepsa, N. M. (2017) · Indian Journal of Corporate Governance · doi:10.1177/0974686217701467 · Cited by 732
Cull, R., Li, W., Sun, B., & Xu, L. C. (2015) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.10.012 · Cited by 585
Self-citationCEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence from micro data
Kato, T., & Long, C. (2006) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2006.08.002 · Cited by 293
Metadata
- Authors
- Xu, L. C., Zhu, T., & Lin, Y.
- Venue
- Economics of Transition
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-01
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-24
- ISSN
- 0967-0750 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0351
- OpenAlex
- W1619462857
- Cited by
- 180
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 49.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Xu, L. C., Zhu, T., & Lin, Y. (2005). Politician control, agency problems and ownership reform: Evidence from China*. Economics of Transition. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00205.x
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