The Genesis, Design and Effects of Regional Institutions: Lessons from East Asia and the Middle East

Norm-based institutional accounts have largely disregarded systematic explanations of domestic changes related to internationalization.

“Given EA's unparalleled integration in the global economy, it is particularly baffling that norm-based institutional accounts have largely disregarded systematic explanations of domestic changes related to internationalization.”

• cites [41] sourceCould not verify

  The Abstract says neoliberal institutionalism has focused largely on successful Western institutions, and Universal Explanations says existing accounts fail to explain differing U.S. approaches to Europe and Asia. Neither passage addresses whether norm-based institutional accounts have disregarded explanations of domestic changes related to internationalization. Searches for “internationalization” and domestic transformation found no passage making that point. (LLM, conf=0.73)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Understanding the nature of dominant domestic coalitions is often crucial for explaining incentives to create, design, and fine-tune the effects of institutions.

“The main findings from these cases suggest that understanding the nature of dominant domestic coalitions is often crucial for explaining incentives to create, design, and fine-tune the effects of institutions.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Dominant domestic political coalitions create regional institutions that strengthen their own position in power or thwart their decline.

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation established three basic principles: respect for state sovereignty, nonintervention, and renouncing the threat or use of force.

“The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation promoted ''perpetual peace, everlasting amity, and cooperation, establishing three basic principles: respect for state sovereignty, nonintervention, and renouncing the threat or use of force.''”

ASEAN is not a collective security arrangement.

“It is not a collective security arrangement”

In many cases, the consequences of creating or designing institutions for power distribution, transaction costs, and norms are sizeable, reducing the explanatory influence of domestic coalitions.

“In many cases these consequences are sizeable, reducing the explanatory influence of domestic coalitions.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Dominant domestic political coalitions create regional institutions that strengthen their own position in power or thwart their decline.

ASEAN is the oldest surviving regional institution in East Asia.

“ASEAN is the oldest surviving regional institution in EA.”

ASEAN's informal design is geared toward conflict-avoidance rather than conflict-resolution or dispute settlement.

“Design: ASEAN's informal design is geared toward ''conflict-avoidance'' rather than ''conflict-resolution'' or ''dispute settlement.''”

Extant accounts do not support tracing ASEAN's origins to common identity and converging values.

“Finally, extant accounts do not support tracing ASEAN's origins to common ''identity'' and converging values.”

• cites Acharya (2001, 28)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

By the 1950s and 1960s, Lebanon's model, based on extensive extra-regional trade and commercial and banking interests, was threatened everywhere else.

“By the 1950s and 1960s, Lebanon's model, based on extensive extra-regional trade and commercial and banking interests, was threatened everywhere else.”

Transparency of intentions has not been high in the hierarchy of objectives in the Arab League context.

“Nor has transparency of intentions (enhancing information) been high in the hierarchy of objectives.”

Article 8 codified nonintervention in domestic systems of government.

“Article 8 codified nonintervention in domestic systems of government.”

Even unanimous League decisions against aggressors would not be binding on disputes over states' independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity.

“However, even unanimous decisions against aggressors would not be binding on disputes over states' ''independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity.''”

Efforts to reduce transaction costs did not appear central to the League's creation.

“Efforts to reduce transaction costs did not appear central.”

Expectations that the League's design would reduce transaction costs were not high.

“Nor were expectations that its design would reduce transaction costs very high.”

Interdependence was very low in the Middle East in the 1940s.

“Interdependence was very low in the 1940s.”

• cites [29] Gomaa Ahmed, 1977Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

There was no normative convergence over the proper interpretation of Arabism.

“Finally, there was no normative convergence over the proper interpretation of Arabism.”

Inter-Arab trade remained rather stable at 7-10 percent of total trade since the 1950s.

“Inter-Arab trade remained rather stable at 7-10 percent of total trade since the 1950s, and capital movements were small.”

• cites [29] Gomaa Ahmed, 1977Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Weaker states were not mere regime takers in these institutions.

“Weaker states were not mere regime takers here.”

The US did not particularly exhibit tendencies to build institutions to extend its power at the time of APEC or the ARF's creation.

“Hegemons may have incentives to build institutions to extend their power, but the US did not particularly exhibit such tendencies at the time of APEC or the ARF's creation (the only cases involving US participation analyzed here).”

Plans for an Arab Common Market from the 1950s to the 1970s never yielded results.

“Plans for an Arab Common Market (1950s-1970s) never yielded results.”

Focal points failed to emerge in major crises including the Baghdad Pact, the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's 1990s brinkmanship, the 2003 Iraq War, or Iran's nuclear program.

“Focal points failed to emerge in major crises, including the Baghdad Pact, the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's 1990s brinkmanship, the 2003 Iraq War and ensuing debacle, or Iran's nuclear program, among others.”

Middle powers and smaller states provided initial momentum for the creation of ASEAN and the ARF.

“Middle powers and smaller states provided initial momentum for their creation.”

The League's treaties on trade and capital movements specified that their provisions would not apply to articles subject to government monopoly.

“Notably, the League's treaties on trade and capital movements specified that ''the provisions of this convention shall not be applicable to articles subject to government monopoly'' (Macdonald 1965, 194-98).”

• cites Macdonald 1965, 194-98 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

The baseline conditions of the propositions were not met half of the time, when consequences for power, transaction costs, and norms were sizeable.

“These baseline conditions were not met half of the time, when such consequences were sizeable.”

The Lebanon-UAR 1958 crisis allowed Nasser to paralyze the League.

“Although cited as uncommonly successful, the Lebanon-UAR 1958 crisis allowed Nasser to paralyze the League.”

• cites Hasou 1985Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The League succeeded in only six of 77 inter-Arab conflicts between 1945 and 1981.

“It succeeded in only six of 77 inter-Arab conflicts between 1945and 1981(Awad 1994, 153;Hassouna 1975).”

• cites Awad 1994, 153 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Hassouna 1975Not checked — no full text of the source

Even the US hegemon's preferences changed from the pre- to the post-institutional setting for APEC and the ARF.

“Even a hegemon's preferences-those of the US-were changed from the pre-to the post-institutional setting, both for APEC and the ARF.”

Differences in Sukarno and Suharto's political models were pivotal in shaping cooperative regional policies, more so than any abstract conceptions of relative power and state survival.

“Differences in Sukarno and Suharto's political models were pivotal in shaping cooperative regional policies, more so than any abstract conceptions of relative power and state survival.”

ASEAN-style consensus supported a rapidly changing environment requiring regional and domestic stability for members at different stages of internationalization.

“Third, ASEAN-style consensus supported a rapidly changing environment requiring regional and domestic stability for members at different stages of internationalization.”

The result was regional institutions that were not rigid and legalistic but, in Goldilocks fashion, just right for accommodating different variants of comparable export-led growth coalitions.

“The result was regional institutions that were not rigid and legalistic but, in Goldilocks fashion, ''just right'' for accommodating different variants of comparable export-led growth coalitions.”

Various approaches can explain ASEAN's informal design but none determines it a priori.

“Various approaches can explain this informal design but none determines it a priori.”

Informality does not appear to be a sine-qua-non derivative of relative-power considerations.

“Hence, informality does not appear to be a sine-qua-non derivative of relative-power considerations.”

The explanatory importance of dominant domestic coalitions is mainly limited to cases where the consequences of creating or designing institutions for power distribution, transaction costs, and norms are negligible or hard to estimate.

“However, this is mainly the case when the consequences of creating or designing institutions for power distribution, transaction costs, and norms are negligible or hard to estimate.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Dominant domestic political coalitions create regional institutions that strengthen their own position in power or thwart their decline.

Proposals for preferential trade agreements-ASEAN Industrial Project, ASEAN Industrial Complementation, and ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture-had all failed.

“Proposals for preferential trade agreements-ASEAN Industrial Project, ASEAN Industrial Complementation, and ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture-had all failed (Stubbs 2000).”

• cites Stubbs 2000 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Clear normative convergence can make norms far more prominent in decisions to create institutions.

“Instead, clear normative convergence can make norms far more prominent in decisions to create institutions.”

Differences in domestic arrangements and integration into the global economy may explain the design of East Asia's regional institutions: informal, process-driven, reliant on consensual decision-making, and largely oriented toward open regionalism.

“These differences may explain the design of EA's regional institutions: informal, process-driven, reliant on consensual decision-making, and largely oriented toward ''open regionalism.''”

During the relevant period, most dominant coalitions in East Asia shared fundamental preferences for growth-oriented strategies as sources of domestic political legitimacy, which dictated heavy reliance on the global political economy and its institutions.

“During the relevant period, most dominant coalitions in EA shared fundamental preferences for growth-oriented strategies as sources of domestic political legitimacy, which dictated heavy reliance on the global political economy and its institutions (Solingen 2007b).”

• cites Solingen 2007bNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The relative weight of each variable will be harder to assess when design has more clear and weighty implications for states' power or transaction costs, or when there is a clear normative convergence throughout a region for a given institutional form.

“The relative weight of each variable will be harder to assess when design has more clear and weighty implications for states' power or transaction costs, or when there is a clear normative convergence throughout a region for a given institutional form.”

Efforts to develop a common identity may have emerged later as a result of ASEAN's evolution but are doubtfully its cause.

“Efforts to develop a common identity may have emerged later as a result of ASEAN's evolution but are doubtfully its cause.”

The nature and strength of dominant domestic coalitions best explain the origins of regional institutions when: (a) the domestic distributional implications of these institutions are clear to most actors; (b) the consequences for regional power distribution are negligible or unclear; (c) state-level transaction costs are unclear or not easily measurable; and (d) there is little normative convergen

“Proposition 1: The nature and strength of dominant domestic coalitions best explain the origins of regional institutions when: (a) The domestic distributional implications of these institutions are clear to most actors; (b) The consequences for regional power distribution are negligible or unclear; (c) State-level transaction costs are unclear or not easily measurable; and (d) There is little norm”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Dominant domestic political coalitions create regional institutions that strengthen their own position in power or thwart their decline.

Under the restrictive conditions of Proposition 2, design would reflect dominant preferences of domestic coalitions.

“Under these restrictive conditions, design would reflect dominant preferences of domestic coalitions.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Dominant domestic political coalitions create regional institutions that strengthen their own position in power or thwart their decline.

Uncertainty about whether a new institution will reduce states' transaction costs renders transaction costs less pertinent.

“Similarly, uncertainty about whether a new institution will reduce states' transaction costs renders the latter less pertinent.”

Institutions may have relatively unimportant distributional effects on domestic coalitions but significant effects on normative, power, or transaction costs considerations.

“Indeed, institutions may have relatively unimportant distributional effects on domestic coalitions but significant effects on normative, power, or transaction costs considerations.”

Regional institutions are more likely to benefit the dominant domestic coalitions that created them in the first place when: (a) the domestic distributional effects of institutions are both sizeable and clear to dominant domestic actors; (b) the institution's effects on power distribution across states are negligible or unclear; (c) the institution has modest effects on reducing states'

“Proposition 3: Regional institutions are more likely to benefit the dominant domestic coalitions that created them in the first place when: (a) The domestic distributional effects of institutions are both sizeable and clear to dominant domestic actors; (b) The institution's effects on power distribution across states are negligible or unclear; (c) The institution has modest effects on reducing”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Dominant domestic political coalitions create regional institutions that strengthen their own position in power or thwart their decline.

The converging interest of ASEAN's dominant coalitions in collaborating regionally was geared to protect their model from interrelated domestic insurgencies and regional threats to their model's domestic dominance.

“Their converging interest in collaborating regionally was geared to protect their model from interrelated domestic insurgencies and regional threats to their model's domestic dominance.”

The nature and strength of domestic political coalitions best explain the design of regional institutions when: (a) the domestic distributional implications of institutional design are clear to most actors; (b) the consequences of design for power distribution across states are negligible or unclear; (c) variations in institutional design have little effect on transaction costs or such costs are

“Proposition 2: The nature and strength of domestic political coalitions best explain the design of regional institutions when (a) The domestic distributional implications of institutional design are clear to most actors; (b) The consequences of design for power distribution across states are negligible or unclear; (c) Variations in institutional design have little effect on transaction costs or”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Dominant domestic political coalitions create regional institutions that strengthen their own position in power or thwart their decline.

Dominant domestic coalitions often provide no more than permissive conditions for the emergence, design, and effect of institutions.

“The latter often provide no more than permissive conditions for the emergence, design, and effect of institutions.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Dominant domestic political coalitions create regional institutions that strengthen their own position in power or thwart their decline.

Conditions where institutional effects on power, norms, and transaction costs are all uncertain or negligible may not be common.

“Yet conditions where institutional effects on power, norms, and transaction costs are all uncertain or negligible may not be common.”

Under the conditions of Proposition 1, there is clear a priori specification of the preferences of dominant domestic coalitions driving institutional creation.

“Under those conditions there is clear a priori specification of the preferences of dominant domestic coalitions (state officials and societal allies) driving institutional creation.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Dominant domestic political coalitions create regional institutions that strengthen their own position in power or thwart their decline.

When implications for state power, transaction costs, and domestic politics are sizeable or unambiguous, it is harder to establish their relative weight in institutional creation.

“When implications for state power, transaction costs, and domestic politics are sizeable or unambiguous it is harder to establish their relative weight in institutional creation.”

Dominant coalitions in ASEAN's Five launched a model of economic growth through engagement in the global economy.

“Dominant coalitions in ASEAN's Five launched a model of economic growth through engagement in the global economy.”

The assumption of normative convergence as the basis for ASEAN's design remains problematic.

“However, the assumption of normative convergence as the basis for ASEAN's design remains problematic.”

The negligible or unclear implications for relative power, transaction costs, or norms, and the more clear implications for domestic ruling coalitions privilege the latter as an explanation in the ASEAN case, offering significant support for Proposition 1's baseline conditions.

“In sum, the negligible or unclear implications for relative power, transaction costs, or norms, and the more clear implications for domestic ruling coalitions privilege the latter as an explanation in this case, offering significant support for Proposition 1's baseline conditions.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: Dominant domestic political coalitions create regional institutions that strengthen their own position in power or thwart their decline.

Uncertainty about how an emerging institution may affect power distribution across states renders relative power much less relevant.

“Uncertainty about how an emerging institution may affect power distribution across states renders relative power much less relevant.”

Domestic groups favoring internationalization were APEC's main beneficiaries.

“Domestic groups favoring internationalization were APEC's main beneficiaries.”

The case for normative convergence around an internationalizing economic project, though plausible, is hard to separate from the interests of ruling coalitions and associated economic networks that created APEC.

“The case for normative convergence around an internationalizing economic project, though plausible, is hard to separate from the interests of ruling coalitions and associated economic networks that created APEC.”

The implications for regional power distribution seemed unclear or negligible at the time the ARF was created.

“The implications for regional power distribution seemed unclear or negligible at the time the ARF was created.”

The US preferred bilateralism and global institutions-where it played major roles-to regional institutions that might detract from both.

“The US preferred bilateralism and global institutions-where it played major roles-to regional institutions that might detract from both (Krauss 2000).”

• cites Krauss 2000 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

ASEAN itself had little impact on the progressive democratization of Southeast Asia, as suggested most recently in its restrained response to the Myanmar junta's repression of domestic dissent.

“Finally, ASEAN itself had little impact on the progressive democratization of Southeast Asia, as suggested most recently in its restrained response to the Myanmar junta's repression of domestic dissent, which-as of late October 2007-had not gone beyond expressions of revulsion.”

A state-level account obscures the role of the true agents of APEC's creation: ruling coalitions sharing significantly converging orientations to the global economy despite heterogeneous state size, power, regimes, norms, culture, and histories.

“A state-level account obscures the role of the true agents of APEC's creation: ruling coalitions sharing significantly converging orientations to the global economy despite heterogeneous state size, power, regimes, norms, culture, and histories.”

The ARF thus supports Proposition 2 insofar as its design was compatible with the interests of dominant ruling coalitions.

“The ARF thus supports Proposition 2 insofar as its design was compatible with the interests of dominant ruling coalitions.”

ASEAN has enabled internationalizing ruling coalitions to sustain themselves over decades of relative domestic and regional stability, and steady access to foreign investment and export markets.

“Above all, ASEAN has enabled internationalizing ruling coalitions to sustain themselves over decades of relative domestic and regional stability, and steady access to foreign investment and export markets.”

Only large corporations were systematically involved in its activities (particularly through PECC); labor, smaller enterprises, and others were marginalized.

“Only large corporations were systematically involved in its activities (particularly through PECC); labor, smaller enterprises, and others were marginalized.”

APEC's output, if limited, reflects some consensus around norms of open regionalism and market-driven liberalization, even if this consensus did not include all domestic constituencies.

“APEC's output, if limited, reflects some consensus around norms of open regionalism and market-driven liberalization, even if this consensus did not include all domestic constituencies.”

Norms may have been overlaid on extant realities to explain ASEAN's modus operandi.

“First, norms may have been overlaid on extant realities to explain ASEAN's modus operandi.”

ASEAN's experience supports baseline Proposition 2 only to a limited extent.

“ASEAN's experience thus supports baseline Proposition 2 only to a limited extent.”

The implications of informality for power distribution across states were negligible.

“The implications of informality for power distribution across states were negligible.”

The diffusion of institutional norms unto the domestic arena appears most significant in the arena of economic policy, particularly openness to foreign investment.

“The diffusion of institutional norms unto the domestic arena appears most significant in the arena of economic policy, particularly openness to foreign investment.”

However, the ARF's extreme informality and the fact that its implications for power distribution were unclear at its genesis may account for the agreement to create it.

“However, the ARF's extreme informality (see below), and the fact that its implications for power distribution were unclear at its genesis, may account for the agreement to create it.”

Disentangling the effect of ideological commitments from the interests of domestic coalitions is difficult.

“Disentangling the effect of ideological commitments from the interests of domestic coalitions, however, is difficult (Aggarwal 1995;Kahler 1995).”

• cites Aggarwal 1995Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Kahler 1995Not checked — no full text of the source

Expansion of intra-regional trade from 30 (1970s) to nearly 70 percent (1990s) of total trade makes room for efficiency accounts of APEC's origins as a tool for states to manage growing interdependence.

“Expansion of intra-regional trade from 30 (1970s) to nearly 70 percent (1990s) of total trade makes room for efficiency accounts of APEC's origins as a tool for states to manage growing interdependence.”

APEC's design can be traced to the nature of domestic coalitions that envisaged it as an informal mechanism of economic growth oriented to the global economy without coercing more trade liberalization than was politically feasible domestically.

“Design: APEC's design too can be traced to the nature of domestic coalitions that envisaged it as an informal mechanism of economic growth oriented to the global economy without coercing more trade liberalization than was politically feasible domestically.”

PAFTAD, PBEC, PECC, and ABAC played important roles, in the absence of material sanctions, in promoting those consensual norms.

“PAFTAD, PBEC, PECC, and ABAC played important roles, in the absence of material sanctions, in promoting those consensual norms.”

This boomerang effect can be traced to shared objectives of dominant coalitions in the first place.

“However, this boomerang effect can be traced to shared objectives of dominant coalitions in the first place.”

Maintaining regional stability and cooperation-critical for ruling coalitions-is APEC's crucial though latent objective.

“Maintaining regional stability and cooperation-critical for ruling coalitions-is APEC's crucial though latent objective (Ravenhill 2006).”

• cites Ravenhill 2006Not matched

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ASEAN's frequent meetings facilitated socialization.

“ASEAN's frequent meetings also facilitated socialization.”

To the extent that ASEAN created an aura of regional stability, it benefited ruling coalitions by facilitating implementation of export-led growth models.

“To the extent that ASEAN created an aura of regional stability, it benefited ruling coalitions by facilitating implementation of export-led growth models.”

Mutually reinforcing interests and norms thus may have underpinned the ARF's creation.

“Mutually reinforcing interests and norms thus may have underpinned the ARF's creation.”

Insofar as the ARF is an inclusive forum advancing cooperative security, not a balancing mechanism like NATO, the ARF's emergence seems anomalous for neorealism.

“Insofar as the ARF is an inclusive forum advancing cooperative security, not a balancing mechanism like NATO, the ARF's emergence seems anomalous for neorealism.”

APEC's effects hardly reflect anyone's hegemonic preferences but rather the lowest common denominator comfortable to all.

“APEC's effects hardly reflect anyone's hegemonic preferences but rather the lowest common denominator comfortable to all.”

Expectations regarding reductions in states' transaction costs cannot explain the occurrence and timing of shifts in perception that interests might be better served by regional rather than global multilateralism.

“However, expectations regarding reductions in states' transaction costs cannot explain the occurrence and timing of shifts in perception that interests might be better served by regional rather than global multilateralism (Ravenhill 1998).”

• cites Ravenhill 1998Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Relative power, transaction costs, norms, and domestic coalitions are underdetermining; they did not necessarily compel ASEAN's informality.

“At the same time, relative power, transaction costs, norms, and domestic coalitions are all underdetermining, that is, did not necessarily compel ASEAN's informality.”

In sum, APEC's case renders significant support for Proposition 1 tracing its genesis to the nature of domestic coalitions and their regional networks, such as PECC.

“In sum, APEC's case renders significant support for Proposition 1 tracing its genesis to the nature of domestic coalitions and their regional networks, such as PECC.”

These findings are compatible with Proposition 3, tracing APEC's moderate institutional effects to the preferences of domestic coalitions which created APEC in the first place.

“These findings are compatible with Proposition 3, tracing APEC's moderate institutional effects to the preferences of domestic coalitions which created APEC in the first place.”

Beyond facilitating some bilateral and sub-regional discussions, ARF meetings could hardly reduce transaction costs.

“Beyond facilitating some bilateral and sub-regional discussions, ARF meetings could hardly reduce transaction costs.”

Arabism had more powerful unintended centrifugal effects than the intended centripetal ones it was assumed to encourage.

“Arabism had more powerful unintended centrifugal effects than the intended centripetal ones it was assumed to encourage.”

Barnett's study shows that efforts to define clear collective Arab norms regarding unity, the West, and Israel threatened ruling coalitions.

“However, Barnett's (1998) study provides more complex insights.Paradoxically, efforts to define clear collective Arab norms (Arabism) regarding unity, the West, and Israel threatened ruling coalitions.”

• cites Barnett (1998)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Perceived pressures to develop focal points fueled competitive outbidding among leaders who sought to impose their own particular normative vision.

“Perceived pressures to develop focal points fueled competitive outbidding among leaders who sought to impose their own particular normative vision.”

Evolving pressures for an elusive normative convergence reinforced the original choice favoring informality in the League.

“Evolving pressures for an elusive normative convergence reinforced the original choice favoring informality.”

The League was not a lightly bureaucratized institution.

“This was not a lightly bureaucratized institution.”

That Arab states established the very first regional institution-the Arab League-in 1945 adds to the paradox of stunted institutional development suggested by the AHDR.

“That Arab states established the very first regional institution-the Arab League-in 1945 adds to the paradox of stunted institutional development suggested by the AHDR.”

Leaders were primarily protecting their own domestic political arrangements more than their states' hard shells.

“Clearly, leaders were primarily protecting their own domestic political arrangements more than their states' ''hard shells.''”

The Alexandria Protocol made the potential domestic implications of unity clear to domestic actors, inducing Arab leaders to oppose it.

“The Alexandria Protocol made the potential domestic implications of unity clear to domestic actors, inducing Arab leaders to oppose it.”

The League mobilized two competing domestic camps: those who balked at any regional entity limiting independence and those who balked at one that did not advance Arab unity.

“It thus mobilized two competing domestic camps: those who balked at any regional entity limiting independence and those who balked at one that did not advance Arab unity.”

Competing political-economy models obstructed changes toward greater formality in the League.

“Competing politicaleconomy models obstructed changes toward greater formality (Solingen 2007b).”

• cites Solingen 2007bNot matched

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These coalitions shared a fundamental preference for creating a weak regional institution that could not limit their freedom of action at home or abroad.

“These coalitions shared a fundamental preference for creating a weak regional institution that could not limit their freedom of action at home or abroad.”

So pivotal was the penchant for independence at the time of the League's creation that activities were initially restricted to economic, cultural, and social but not political cooperation.

“So pivotal was the penchant for independence at the time of the League's creation that activities were initially restricted to economic, cultural, and social but not political cooperation.”

However, the domestic distributional effects of the ARF were not sizeable, adding only marginally to existing incentives of dominant coalitions to maintain peace and stability throughout the region.

“However, the domestic distributional effects of the ARF were not sizeable, adding only marginally to existing incentives of dominant coalitions to maintain peace and stability throughout the region.”

The Pact foreclosed even the mildest forms of intervention in a crucial category of conflict.

“The Pact thus foreclosed even the mildest forms of intervention in a crucial category of conflict.”

The League was created as a substitute for, not a conduit to, Arab unification.

“The League was created as a substitute for, not a conduit to, Arab unification.”

Ruling coalitions created the League to protect their regimes from competing pan-Arab nationalist agendas.

“Ruling coalitions created the League to protect their regimes from competing pan-Arab nationalist agendas.”

This was never realized because individual leaders' ambitions dominated the hierarchy of collective objectives throughout the League's history.

“This was never realized because individual leaders' ambitions dominated the hierarchy of collective objectives throughout the League's history.”

The most important forces underlying its creation were, ironically, ruling coalitions seeking to guarantee their own sovereignty and independence against advocates of Arab unity.

“The most important forces underlying its creation were, ironically, ruling coalitions seeking to guarantee their own sovereignty and independence against advocates of Arab unity.”

Understanding the incentives of ruling coalitions reduces this sense of paradox.

“However, understanding the incentives of ruling coalitions reduces this sense of paradox.”

High public ambiguity vis-à-vis Arab unity, the West, and Israel helped leaders survive politically at home.

“Indeed, high public ambiguity vis-a `-vis Arab unity, the West, and Israel helped leaders survive politically at home.”

Intense competition for the mantle of Arabism undermined the development of focal points.

“A shared language and culture might have obviated more formal arrangements, but intense competition for the mantle of Arabism undermined the development of focal points.”

Tensions between kawmiyah and watanyia influenced the League's design.

“Tensions between kawmiyah (pan-Arab) and watanyia (state nationalism) would also influence the League's design.”

Economic models stressing factor endowments discount the benefits of Arab economic integration claimed by political advocates.

“Economic models stressing factor endowments discount the benefits of Arab economic integration claimed by political advocates.”

The ARF suggests that even great powers may acquiesce to institutions as faits accomplis even when they might have preferred the status-quo ante.

“The ARF also suggests that even great powers-China and the US-may acquiesce to institutions as faits accomplis even when they-at least at first-might have preferred the status-quo ante.”

The League's record supports Proposition 3, enabling dominant coalitions to protect inward-looking self-sufficiency, state and military entrepreneurship, import-substitution, and nationalism.

“All these suggest significant support for Proposition 3, enabling dominant coalitions to protect inward-looking self-sufficiency, state and military entrepreneurship, import-substitution, and nationalism.”

Given its origins and design, the League's effects have been limited.

“Given its origins and design it is hardly surprising that the League's effects have been limited.”

Hegemonic arguments cannot explain progression from pre- to post-institutional environments.

“Hegemonic arguments cannot explain progression from pre to post-institutional environments.”

ASEAN, APEC, and the Arab League match baseline Proposition 1: domestic coalitions as privileged explanations, given low normative convergence and negligible consequences for relative power or transaction costs.

“ASEAN, APEC, and the Arab League match the circumstances outlined by baseline Proposition 1: domestic coalitions as privileged explanations, given low normative convergence and negligible consequences (of creating institutions) for relative power or transaction costs.”

Most other conditions suggested by the baseline proposition were not met for the League.

“Beyond that, however, most other conditions suggested by the baseline proposition were not met.”

Ruling coalitions converged on the creation of an institution that would reduce pressures for unification.

“Ruling coalitions thus converged on the creation of an institution that would reduce pressures for unification.”

The League was ultimately created to counter the pan-Arab design.

“However, ironically, the League was ultimately created to counter this pan-Arab design.”

Comparative studies by Zacher and Nye rank the League's success in abating conflict as considerably lower than the OAU and the OAS.

“Comparative studies by Zacher (1979) and Nye (1987) rank the League's success in abating conflict as considerably lower than the OAU and the OAS.”

• cites Zacher (1979)Not checked — no full text of the source
• cites Nye (1987)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The League's informality seemed overdetermined, overwhelming competing pan-Arab norms favoring formal unity.

“Thus, the League's informality seemed overdetermined, overwhelming competing pan-Arab norms favoring formal unity.”

These inward-looking models led to further declines in intra-regional trade.

“These models, oriented toward self-sufficiency and state entrepreneurship, led to further declines in intra-regional trade.”

The role of domestic coalitions is essential for explaining the genesis of all four institutions.

“The role of domestic coalitions is found to be essential for explaining the genesis of all four institutions.”

In the absence of normative convergence in all these cases, norms appear less relevant to explaining the origin of East Asian institutions.

“In the absence of normative convergence in all these cases, norms appear less relevant to explaining the origin of East Asian institutions.”

Neorealist understandings of institutional origins hinging on hegemony face difficulties in East Asia.

“Neorealist understandings of institutional origins hinging on hegemony face difficulties in EA.”

The League's limited effects benefited ruling coalitions in each state, allowing them to entrench themselves in power rather than abrogate sovereign rights on behalf of pan-Arabism.

“These limited effects clearly benefited ruling coalitions in each state, allowing them to entrench themselves in power rather than abrogate sovereign rights on behalf of pan-Arabism.”

The nature of dominant domestic coalitions often explains incentives to create institutions, shape them according to their interests, and fine-tune their effects to serve their purposes.

“These cases suggest that the nature of dominant domestic coalitions often explains incentives to create institutions, shape them according to their interests, and fine-tune their effects to serve their purposes.”

Only APEC's blueprint matches the conditions of baseline Proposition 2, where domestic coalitions do most of the explanatory work.

“Only APEC's blueprint matches the conditions of baseline Proposition 2, where domestic coalitions do most of the explanatory work, compromising over an informal APEC that accommodates diverse stages and forms of economic liberalization and export-led growth.”

On the whole, the effects of East Asian institutions were arguably minimal.

“On the whole, the effects of East Asian institutions were arguably minimal, with various approaches providing plausible accounts for this outcome.”

Similarities in design across the Middle East and East Asia suggest that regional institutions may not be as peculiar or idiosyncratic as many region-specific interpretations would have it.

“Above all, similarities in design across the Middle East and East Asia suggest that regional institutions may not be as peculiar or idiosyncratic as many region-specific (frequently norm-based) interpretations would have it.”

State enterprises, agriculture, and local governments resisting openness were also part of China's coalition opposing internationalization.

“State enterprises, agriculture, and local governments resisting openness were also part of China's coalition opposing internationalization(Christensen 2001).”

• cites Christensen 2001 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

The analytical neglect of internationalization, and of the domestic coalitions that sanctioned it, obscures the most fundamental feature differentiating EA from other industrializing regions.

“The analytical neglect of internationalization, and of the domestic coalitions that sanctioned it, obscures the most fundamental feature differentiating EA from other industrializing regions.”

Comparisons between East Asia and the EU face the potentially confounding effects of heterogeneity in industrialization stages.

“Among other things, comparisons between East Asia and the EU face the potentially confounding effects of heterogeneity in industrialization stages, whereas East Asia and the Middle East largely shared comparable initial conditions in the post-World War II era.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: East Asia and the Middle East largely shared comparable initial conditions in the post-World War II era.

The role of domestic coalitions is underdetermining in explaining institutional design in ASEAN, the ARF, and the League.

“The role of domestic coalitions is found to be underdetermining in explaining institutional design in ASEAN, the ARF, and the League.”

The informal design of the League was overdetermined by the interests of ruling coalitions, efforts to stem hegemonic aspirations, and the defeat of pan-Arab norms of formal unity.

“The informal design of the League was overdetermined by the interests of ruling coalitions, efforts to stem hegemonic aspirations, and the defeat of pan-Arab norms of formal unity.”

All East Asian cases suggest high compatibility between internationalizing coalitions and informal institutional design.

“All East Asian cases suggest high compatibility between internationalizing coalitions and informal institutional design.”

Functionalist accounts reveal difficulties in measuring transaction-cost reductions a priori and even a posteriori.

“Functionalist accounts reveal difficulties in measuring transactioncost reductions a priori and even a posteriori.”

All four cases validate the expectation that institutions benefit their creators.

“All four cases validate the expectation that institutions benefit their creators.”

Legalization does not necessarily contribute to higher compliance.

“Legalization does not necessarily contribute to higher compliance(Lutz and Sikkink 2000).”

• cites Lutz and Sikkink 2000Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The League's design, codified in Article 8 regarding non-intervention in domestic affairs, reflected efforts to avoid hegemony no less than the preferences of dominant domestic coalitions.

“The League's design-codified in Article 8 regarding non-intervention in domestic affairs-reflected efforts to avoid hegemony no less than the preferences of dominant domestic coalitions.”

Domestic coalitions offer only a baseline for understanding institutional design, albeit an important one.

“Domestic coalitions thus offer only a baseline for understanding institutional design, albeit an important one.”

Relative-power considerations do not capture well the important role played by smaller powers in the design of these institutions.

“Overall, relative-power considerations do not capture well the important role played by smaller powers in the design of these institutions.”

Findings suggest extensive gaps in each perspective's ability to explain institutional effects single-handedly.

“Findings also suggest extensive gaps in each perspective's ability to explain institutional effects single-handedly.”

The nature of domestic coalitions can be underdetermining, compatible with different institutional designs, often providing no more than permissive conditions for their emergence and effects.

“Furthermore, the nature of domestic coalitions can be underdetermining, compatible with different institutional designs, often providing no more than permissive conditions for their emergence and effects.”

Institutions provided significant venues for advancing common objectives of economic growth via engagement with the global economy and regional stability.

“Institutions nonetheless provided significant venues for advancing common objectives of economic growth via engagement with the global economy and regional stability.”

Only ASEAN and the League meet Proposition 3's baseline conditions, privileging domestic coalitions in explaining institutional effects.

“However, only ASEAN and the League meet Proposition 3's baseline conditions, privileging domestic coalitions in explaining institutional effects.”

Internationalizing coalitions and their informal networks, more than regional institutions, have been the foundation of East Asia's cooperative regional order, economic and otherwise.

“Internationalizing coalitions and their informal networks-more than regional institutions-have been the foundation of EA's cooperative regional order, economic and otherwise.”

The cases examined cast doubt on blanket functionalist premises that formal institutions arise to manage interdependence.

“The cases examined here indeed cast doubt on blanket functionalist premises that formal institutions arise to manage interdependence.”

First proposition: domestic coalitions are best positioned to explain the genesis of regional institutions when the consequences of their creation for regional power distribution or transaction costs are negligible or unclear, and where there is little normative convergence surrounding the institution's creation.

“First, domestic coalitions are best positioned to explain the genesis of regional institutions when the consequences of their creation for regional power distribution or transaction costs are negligible or unclear, and where there is little normative convergence surrounding the institution's creation.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The baseline forms of the three propositions assume that the institution's consequences for power, transaction costs, and norms are negligible or hard to estimate.

An emerging cultural 'Asianness' seems less the product of regional institutions than of three decades of growing exchange within the region and with other regions.

“In any case, an emerging cultural ''Asianness'' seems less the product of regional institutions than of three decades of growing exchange within the region, primarily but not only economic, as well as with other regions.”

Third proposition: regional institutions are more likely to benefit the domestic coalitions that created them when institutional effects on power and transaction costs are negligible or not easily measurable, and there is little normative convergence.

“Third, regional institutions are more likely to benefit the domestic coalitions that created them when institutional effects on power and transaction costs are negligible or not easily measurable, and there is little normative convergence.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The baseline forms of the three propositions assume that the institution's consequences for power, transaction costs, and norms are negligible or hard to estimate.

Second proposition: domestic coalitions are likely to explain the design of regional institutions best when the consequences of design for relative power or transaction costs are negligible or not easily measurable, and when there is little normative convergence around a favored design.

“Second, domestic coalitions are likely to explain the design of regional institutions best when the consequences of design for relative power or transaction costs are negligible or not easily measurable, and when there is little normative convergence around a favored design.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The baseline forms of the three propositions assume that the institution's consequences for power, transaction costs, and norms are negligible or hard to estimate.

While generally benefiting the domestic coalitions that gave them life, institutions also have intended, unintended, and unanticipated effects on relative power, norms, and transaction costs.

“While generally benefiting the domestic coalitions that gave them life, institutions also have intended, unintended, and unanticipated effects on relative power, norms, and transaction costs.”

The informal and sovereignty-sensitive nature of these institutions is consistent with neorealist premises that only powerful states can endow institutions with more binding procedures.

“Finally, the informal and sovereignty-sensitive nature of these institutions is consistent with neorealist premises that only powerful states can endow institutions with more binding procedures.”

The consensus rule precluded major powers from advancing their agenda at the expense of the rest.

“The consensus rule precluded major powers from advancing their agenda at the expense of the rest.”

Neorealist approaches are not equipped to address constraining or constitutive effects of institutions on states, unless they stem from hegemonic assertion.

“Neorealist approaches are not equipped to address constraining or constitutive (intended or unintended) effects of institutions on states, unless they stem from hegemonic assertion.”

Enhancing information was not central even for the EU.

“Enhancing information was not central even for the EU(Moravcsik 1998).”

• cites Moravcsik 1998Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Greater institutional formality is potentially detrimental to regional cooperation in East Asia.

“Furthermore,Inoguchi (1997) finds greater institutional formality to be potentially detrimental to regional cooperation in East Asia.”

• cites Inoguchi (1997)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Normative influences are highly contingent and contested.

“Normative influences are highly contingent and contested(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 274).”

• cites Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 274 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Egyptian supporters of a pan-Arab agenda were few but important at the time.

“Egyptian supporters of a pan-Arab agenda were few but important at the time(Macdonald 1965).”

• cites Macdonald 1965 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source