The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Electoral Competition and Democratic Responsiveness: A Defense of the Marginality Hypothesis
Abstract
Does vigorous electoral competition help to convert citizens' preferences into government action? No, concludes a series of theoretical and empirical studies conducted over the last 35 years. If these findings are correct, efforts to enhance competition such as depoliticizing the redistricting process and achieving greater equity in campaign spending, while perhaps beneficial in other respects, will not improve government responsiveness. However, these studies are limited by a shortage of data, by biased measures of district competitiveness, and by their conceptualization of responsiveness. Using both cross-sectional and fixed-effects modeling frameworks, this study finds that in recent years elected officials who represent more competitive districts are indeed more responsive to their constituents' preferences.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Griffin, J. D.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2006-11
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 911-921
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2156520209
- Cited by
- 267
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 38.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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