The Trouble with Tracing
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this paper I argue that the widely relied upon idea of “tracing ” in the theoryof moral responsibility is considerably more problematic than has been previ-ously acknowledged. The difficulty I raise stems from requirements imposed by the knowledge condition on moral responsibility. Suppose you believed that being a responsible agent (at least paradigmati-cally) involves being suitably sensitive to situation-relevant moral concerns. On this view, agents that are not suitably sensitive to the relevant moral concerns (these may include non-human animals, young children, and presumably some adults with particular conditions) are not appropriate candidates for ascriptions of moral responsibility. Though this sort of theory may have the sheen of plausi-bility to it, it is not difficult to generate problem cases for the theory as stated. For instance, suppose that while he is intoxicated Luis decides to drive home while his intoxication has rendered him insensitive to the relevant moral concerns. When he runs his Buick over a young mother and two kids on the way home from the bar, we do not thereby conclude that because he was in a state of intoxication suffi-cient to render him insensitive to the relevant moral concerns he was not morally responsible.1 The standard response to problem cases of this sort is to introduce a notion of tracing. Tracing is the idea that responsibility for some outcome need not be anchored in the agent or agent’s action at the moment immediately prior to outcome, but rather at some suitable time prior to the moment of deliberation or action. So one thing that we might say is that Luis ’ responsibility for running over
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“The concept of tracing tries to capture the basic intuition that a human agent may be responsible for an outcome even if she does not satisfy the conditions for responsibility in situ at the time of her action, provided that she was responsible at an earlier time for finding herself later in the position of not satisfying those conditions.”
From Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical Account (2018) · cites this paper as Vargas, 2005
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Cited by
Meaningful Human Control over Autonomous Systems: A Philosophical Account
Santoni de Sio, F., & van den Hoven, J. (2018) · Frontiers in Robotics and AI · doi:10.3389/frobt.2018.00015 · Cited by 566
“The idea of tracing is often used by moral responsibility theorists and according to Manuel Vargas tracing “is one of a few things to which nearly all parties in the debate about free will [and moral responsibility] appeal to with equal enthusiasm” (Vargas, 2005 quoted by Timpe, 2011).”
MethodThinking Outside the (Traditional) Boxes of Moral Luck
Nelkin, D. K. (2019) · Midwest Studies In Philosophy · doi:10.1111/misp.12101 · Cited by 8
Metadata
- Authors
- VARGAS, M.
- Venue
- Midwest Studies in Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2005-09
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 269-291
- ISSN
- 0363-6550
- 1475-4975
- Cited by
- 99
- References
- 36
- Language
- en
- Licence
- doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1 (tdm, 3652 d)
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