Explaining Value: and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Considers the following questions: What accounts for the existence of basic moral disagreements? Why do most people think it is worse to injure someone than to fail to save them from injury? Where does the right of self‐defence come from? Why do many people think it is morally permissible to treat animals in ways we would not treat people? Why are some people moral relativists and others not? What is it to value something and what is it to value something intrinsically? How are a person's values (noun) related to what the person values (verb)? How much of morality can or should be explained in terms of human flourishing or the possession of virtuous character traits? For that matter, are there character traits of the sort we normally suppose there are? How do people come to be moral? Is morality something one learns or does it arise in everyone naturally without instruction?
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Cites
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Cited by
The Emotional Construction of Morals
Prinz, J. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571543.001.0001 · Cited by 679
Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2008) · The Innate Mind, Volume 3 · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195332834.003.0019 · Cited by 650
Harm, Affect, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction
KELLY, D., STICH, S., HALEY, K. J., ENG, S. J., & FESSLER, D. M. T. (2007) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00302.x · Cited by 305
The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents
(2005) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195179675.001.0001 · Cited by 253
VARGAS, M. (2005) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2005.00117.x · Cited by 99
Metadata
- Authors
- Harman, G.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2000-08-17
- OpenAlex
- W4255030355
- Cited by
- 178
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 2.52
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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