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Cited by 331Feminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesFeminist Theory and Gender StudiesEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

25 Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are We Now?

Intemann, Kristen·2010·Hypatia
DOI 10.1111/j.1527-2001.2010.01138.x
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Abstract

Over the past twenty-five years, numerous articles in Hypatia have clarified, revised, and defended increasingly more nuanced views of both feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism. Feminist empiricists have argued that scientific knowledge is contextual and socially situated (Longino 1990; Nelson 1990; Anderson 1995), and standpoint feminists have begun to endorse virtues of theory choice that have been traditionally empiricist (Wylie 2003). In fact, it is unclear whether substantive differences remain. I demonstrate that current versions of feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism now have much in common but that key differences remain. Specifically, they make competing claims about what is required for increasing scientific objectivity. They disagree about 1) the kind of diversity within scientific communities that is epistemically beneficial and 2) the role that ethical and political values can play. In these two respects, feminist empiricists have much to gain from the resources provided by standpoint theory. As a result, the views would be best merged into “feminist standpoint empiricism.”

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  • It is not always possible for individual technology workers to identify or assess their own biases or faulty assumptions.

    “Thus it is not always possible for individual technology workers to identify or assess their own biases or faulty assumptions [33].”

    From Closing the AI accountability gap: defining an end-to-end framework for internal algorithmic auditing (2020) · cites this paper as [33]

  • The essential inclusion of independent domain experts and marginalized groups in the ethical review process has the potential to lead to more rigorous critical reflection because their experiences will often be precisely those that are most needed in identifying problematic background assumptions and revealing limitations with research questions, models, or methodologies.

    “The essential inclusion of independent domain experts and marginalized groups in the ethical review process “has the potential to lead to more rigorous critical reflection because their experiences will often be precisely those that are most needed in identifying problematic background assumptions and revealing limitations with research questions, models, or methodologies” [33].”

    From Closing the AI accountability gap: defining an end-to-end framework for internal algorithmic auditing (2020) · cites this paper as [33]

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Authors
Intemann, K.
Corresponding author
Intemann, Kristen
ORCID
Intemann, Kristen
Venue
Hypatia
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2010
Volume
25
Issue
4
Pages
778-796
ISSN
  • 0887-5367 (ISSN-L)
  • 1527-2001
DOI
10.1111/j.1527-2001.2010.01138.x
OpenAlex
W2150575490
Cited by
331
References
47
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 52 · 2024: 32 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 43 · 2021: 33 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 31 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 4
FWCI
12.47
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 3722 d)
Locations
Hypatia (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Feminist Theory and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
feminist empiricism, standpoint theory, scientific objectivity, intellectual virtues, theory choice, feminist philosophy of science

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