Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War Settlements
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Civil war is usually examined from the perspective of commitment problems. This approach provides considerable insight regarding which civil war agreement provisions reduce the chance of renewed fighting. Yet, additional insight can be gained by examining information asymmetries as a potential cause of civil war recurrence. We argue that significant uncertainty regarding military capabilities may persist after fighting ends and that this uncertainty may lead to the breakdown of peace. However, carefully designed peace agreements can guard against renewed civil war by calling for international monitoring, making the belligerents submit military information to third parties, and providing for verification of this information. Our empirical analysis of 51 civil war settlements between 1945 and 2005 shows that these provisions significantly reduce the risk of new civil war. Encouraging the adoption of these provisions may be a useful policy in the international community's effort to establish peace in civil‐war‐torn societies.
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Cites
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War
FEARON, J. D., & LAITIN, D. D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000534 · Cited by 7,366
Rationalist explanations for war
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“(2005) list of settlements in ethnically divided societies and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialWhy Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?
Fearon, J. D. (2004) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343304043770 · Cited by 1,306
The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement
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Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post‐Civil War Conflict Management
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Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War
Walter, B. F. (2004) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343304043775 · Cited by 690
Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War
Fortna, V. P. (2004) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00301.x · Cited by 673
Cited by
Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting
HULTMAN, L., KATHMAN, J., & SHANNON, M. (2014) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055414000446 · Cited by 325
Dynamics and Logics of Civil War
Cederman, L.-E., & Vogt, M. (2017) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002717721385 · Cited by 214
Loyle, C. E., & Appel, B. J. (2017) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqx045 · Cited by 78
Metadata
- Authors
- Mattes, M., & Savun, B.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-04
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 511-524
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2024361748
- Cited by
- 165
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 13.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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