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Cited by 262

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies

MILLON, MARCIA H., THAKOR, ANJAN V.·1985·The Journal of Finance

Abstract

We propose a theory of information gathering agencies in a world of informational asymmetries and moral hazard. In a setting in which true firm values are certified by screening agents whose payoffs depend on noisy ex post monitors of information quality, the formation of information gathering agencies (groups of screening agents) is justified on two grounds. First, it enables screening agents to diversify their risky payoffs. Second, it allows information sharing. The first effect itself is insufficient despite the risk aversion of screening agents and the stochastic independence of the monitors used to compensate them.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02391.x

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Metadata

Authors
MILLON, M. H., & THAKOR, A. V.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1985-12
Volume
40
Issue
5
Pages
1403-1422
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W2150455572
Cited by
262
References
28
FWCI
10.32
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02391.x
The paper
MILLON, M. H., & THAKOR, A. V. (1985). Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02391.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.