The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies
Abstract
We propose a theory of information gathering agencies in a world of informational asymmetries and moral hazard. In a setting in which true firm values are certified by screening agents whose payoffs depend on noisy ex post monitors of information quality, the formation of information gathering agencies (groups of screening agents) is justified on two grounds. First, it enables screening agents to diversify their risky payoffs. Second, it allows information sharing. The first effect itself is insufficient despite the risk aversion of screening agents and the stochastic independence of the monitors used to compensate them.
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Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing
Ross, S. A. (1976) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(76)90046-6 · Cited by 7,009
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
Ross, S. A. (1973) · American Economic Review · Cited by 4,269
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Brealey, R., Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. H. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03277.x · Cited by 4,055
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation
Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. H. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2326770 · Cited by 3,760
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912246 · Cited by 2,095
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Self-citationCredit Ratings and Capital Structure
KISGEN, D. J. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00866.x · Cited by 840
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (1997) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/10.3.693 · Cited by 604
Self-citationCapital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence
THAKOR, A. V. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05210.x · Cited by 586
Self-citationBank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the Literature
Santos, J. A. C. (2001) · Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments · doi:10.1111/1468-0416.00042 · Cited by 569
Metadata
- Authors
- MILLON, M. H., & THAKOR, A. V.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1985-12
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1403-1422
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2150455572
- Cited by
- 262
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 10.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.