The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions
Abstract
We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross‐sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and compensation incentives or active monitoring. In an analysis of leverage changes, we find that leverage increases in the aftermath of entrenchment‐reducing shocks to managerial security, including unsuccessful tender offers, involuntary CEO replacements, and the addition to the board of major stockholders.
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Cites
The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice
TITMAN, S., & WESSELS, R. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02585.x · Cited by 6,112
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
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Does Delaware law improve firm value?
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Metadata
- Authors
- BERGER, P. G., OFEK, E., & YERMACK, D. L.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1997-09
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1411-1438
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3124317644
- Cited by
- 1,534
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 60.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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