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Cited by 256

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short‐term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly

Diamond, Douglas W.·2004·The Journal of Finance
DOI 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00669.x
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Abstract

In legal systems with expensive or ineffective contract enforcement, it is difficult to induce lenders to enforce debt contracts. If lenders do not enforce, borrowers will have incentives to misbehave. Lenders have incentives to enforce given bad news when debt is short‐term and subject to runs caused by externalities across lenders. Lenders will not undo these externalities by negotiation. The required number of lenders increases with enforcement costs. A very high enforcement cost can exceed the ex ante incentive benefit of enforcement. Removing lenders' right to immediately enforce their debt with a “bail‐in” can improve the ex ante incentives of borrowers.

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Metadata

Authors
Diamond, D. W.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2004-08
Volume
59
Issue
4
Pages
1447-1479
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00669.x
OpenAlex
W2163630232
Cited by
256
References
40
FWCI
20.54
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short‐term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00669.x
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Diamond, D. W. (2004). Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short‐term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00669.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.