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Cited by 470

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Electing Directors

CAI, JIE, GARNER, JACQUELINE L., WALKLING, RALPH A.·2009·The Journal of Finance
DOI 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01504.x
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Abstract

Using a large sample of director elections, we document that shareholder votes are significantly related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and voting mechanisms. However, most variables, except meeting attendance and ISS recommendations, have little economic impact on shareholder votes—even poorly performing directors and firms typically receive over 90% of votes cast. Nevertheless, fewer votes lead to lower “abnormal” CEO compensation and a higher probability of removing poison pills, classified boards, and CEOs. Meanwhile, director votes have little impact on election outcomes, firm performance, or director reputation. These results provide important benchmarks for the current debate on election reforms.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01504.x

Cites

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Metadata

Authors
CAI, J., GARNER, J. L., & WALKLING, R. A.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2009-09-28
Volume
64
Issue
5
Pages
2389-2421
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01504.x
OpenAlex
W4255207779
Cited by
470
References
37
FWCI
46.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Electing Directors. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01504.x
The paper
CAI, J., GARNER, J. L., & WALKLING, R. A. (2009). Electing Directors. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01504.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.