The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
Abstract
Firms with busy boards, those in which a majority of outside directors hold three or more directorships, are associated with weak corporate governance. These firms exhibit lower market‐to‐book ratios, weaker profitability, and lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. Independent but busy boards display CEO turnover‐performance sensitivities indistinguishable from those of inside‐dominated boards. Departures of busy outside directors generate positive abnormal returns (ARs). When directors become busy as a result of acquiring an additional directorship, other companies in which they hold board seats experience negative ARs. Busy outside directors are more likely to depart boards following poor performance.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
The Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns
FAMA, E. F., & FRENCH, K. R. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04398.x · Cited by 17,261
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Theory of Rational Option Pricing
Merton, R. C. (2019) · World Scientific Reference on Contingent Claims Analysis in Corporate Finance · doi:10.1142/9789814759588_0002 · Cited by 7,948
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
Yermack, D. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00844-5 · Cited by 6,603
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00567 · Cited by 5,122
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies
Smith, C. W., & Watts, R. L. (1992) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(92)90029-w · Cited by 3,589
(1997) · CFA Digest · doi:10.2469/dig.v27.n2.79 · Cited by 3,518
Diversification's effect on firm value
Berger, P. G., & Ofek, E. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00798-6 · Cited by 3,061
Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEOPreprint
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1995) · American Economic Review · Cited by 3,014
Board meeting frequency and firm performance
Vafeas, N. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00018-5 · Cited by 2,071
Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth
Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90002-h · Cited by 1,929
Mace, M. L. (1971) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,481
Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments
Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00559 · Cited by 1,479
The Determinants of Board Composition
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555459 · Cited by 1,472
CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis
Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00168 · Cited by 1,295
Self-citationCEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis
Parrino, R. (1997) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00028-7 · Cited by 1,264
Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance
Coughlan, A. T., & Schmidt, R. M. (1985) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(85)90027-8 · Cited by 1,209
Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders
Gilson, S. C. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90060-d · Cited by 1,083
Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective
Huson, M. R., Parrino, R., & Starks, L. T. (2001) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00405 · Cited by 1,070
Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover
Parrino, R., Sias, R. W., & Starks, L. T. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00247-7 · Cited by 1,008
Dodd, P., & Warner, J. B. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90018-1 · Cited by 956
Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers
Shivdasani, A. (1993) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(93)90009-5 · Cited by 906
Self-citationRemuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors
YERMACK, D. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00699.x · Cited by 840
Ownership structure and top executive turnover
Denis, D. J., Denis, D. K., & Sarin, A. (1997) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00016-0 · Cited by 776
Outside directorships and corporate performance
Kaplan, S. N., & Reishus, D. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90061-4 · Cited by 663
Brickley, J. A., Linck, J. S., & Coles, J. L. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00012-4 · Cited by 548
Does Delaware law improve firm value?
Daines, R. (2001) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00086-1 · Cited by 538
Alternative constructions of Tobin's q: An empirical comparison
Perfect, S. B., & Wiles, K. W. (1994) · Journal of Empirical Finance · doi:10.1016/0927-5398(94)90007-8 · Cited by 490
Harford, J. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00108-9 · Cited by 386
Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder's Perspective
PERRY, T., & PEYER, U. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00788.x · Cited by 339
New Evidence on the Market for Directors: Board Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310
Coles, J. L., & Hoi, C. K. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00522 · Cited by 235
The Impact of Stock‐Option Compensation for Outside Directors on Firm Value*
Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2005) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/497048 · Cited by 195
Self-citationFirm Value, Risk, and Growth Opportunities
Shin, H.-H., & Stulz, R. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7808 · Cited by 178
Cited by
The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,358
The Gender and Ethnic Diversity of US Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance
Carter, D. A., D'Souza, F., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2010) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00809.x · Cited by 1,842
Corporate governance and firm performance
Bhagat, S., & Bolton, B. (2008) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.006 · Cited by 1,724
Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., & So, J. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn088 · Cited by 1,297
Risk management, corporate governance, and bank performance in the financial crisis
Aebi, V., Sabato, G., & Schmid, M. (2012) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.10.020 · Cited by 1,053
Metadata
- Authors
- FICH, E. M., & SHIVDASANI, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-03-09
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 689-724
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W4252449759
- Cited by
- 1,660
- References
- 39
- FWCI
- 115.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.