The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings and Dividends to Firm Value Depend on Governance? A Cross‐country Analysis
Abstract
Agency theories predict that the value of corporate cash holdings is less in countries with poor investor protection because of the greater ability of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits from cash holdings in such countries. Using various specifications of the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998), we find that the relation between cash holdings and firm value is much weaker in countries with poor investor protection than in other countries. In further support of the importance of agency theories, the relation between dividends and firm value is weaker in countries with stronger investor protection.
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Cites
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Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
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Newey, W. K., & West, K. D. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913610 · Cited by 16,936
Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests
Fama, E. F., & MacBeth, J. D. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260061 · Cited by 14,258
A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and AutocorrelationConsistent Covariance Matrix
Newey, W., & West, K. (1986) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/t0055 · Cited by 12,278
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,541
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00457 · Cited by 4,050
Cited by
Corporate Financial Policy and the Value of Cash
FAULKENDER, M., & WANG, R. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00894.x · Cited by 1,634
Financial Constraints, Investment, and the Value of Cash Holdings
Denis, D. J., & Sibilkov, V. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp031 · Cited by 1,377
Is cash negative debt? A hedging perspective on corporate financial policies
Acharya, V. V., Almeida, H., & Campello, M. (2007) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2007.04.001 · Cited by 893
International Evidence on Cash Holdings and Expected Managerial Agency Problems
Kalcheva, I., & Lins, K. V. (2007) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm023 · Cited by 820
Do analysts matter for governance? Evidence from natural experiments
Chen, T., Harford, J., & Lin, C. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.10.002 · Cited by 747
Metadata
- Authors
- PINKOWITZ, L., STULZ, R., & WILLIAMSON, R.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-12
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2725-2751
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2121085701
- Cited by
- 1,198
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 101.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- PINKOWITZ, L., STULZ, R., & WILLIAMSON, R. (2006). Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings and Dividends to Firm Value Depend on Governance? A Cross‐country Analysis. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01003.x
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
