The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings and Dividends to Firm Value Depend on Governance? A Cross‐country Analysis
Abstract
Agency theories predict that the value of corporate cash holdings is less in countries with poor investor protection because of the greater ability of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits from cash holdings in such countries. Using various specifications of the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998), we find that the relation between cash holdings and firm value is much weaker in countries with poor investor protection than in other countries. In further support of the importance of agency theories, the relation between dividends and firm value is weaker in countries with stronger investor protection.
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Self-citation
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Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash than They Used To?
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Metadata
- Authors
- PINKOWITZ, L., STULZ, R., & WILLIAMSON, R.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-12
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2725-2751
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2121085701
- Cited by
- 1,198
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 101.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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