The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collective Action through Voluntary Environmental Programs: A Club Theory Perspective
Abstract
Voluntary environmental programs are institutions that seek to induce firms to produce positive environmental externalities beyond what government regulations require. Drawing on club theory, this paper outlines a theoretical perspective to study the relationship between program design and program effectiveness. Effective programs have rule structures that mitigate two central collective action problems inherent in producing positive environmental externalities: attracting firms to participate in the program and ensuring that participating firms adhere to program obligations. Because program efficacy can be undermined by collective action problems associated with free riding and shirking, effective voluntary clubs should be designed to mitigate these challenges.
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Cites
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Cited by
The New Corporate Social Responsibility
Auld, G., Bernstein, S., & Cashore, B. (2008) · Annual Review of Environment and Resources · doi:10.1146/annurev.environ.32.053006.141106 · Cited by 323
Masters of Disasters? An Empirical Analysis of How Societies Benefit from Corporate Disaster Aid
Ballesteros, L., Useem, M., & Wry, T. (2017) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2015.0765 · Cited by 179
The Infrastructure of Collective Action and Policy Content Diffusion in the Organic Food Industry
Lee, B. H. (2009) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2009.47084925 · Cited by 104
Transnational corporations, biosphere stewardship, and sustainable futures
Österblom, H., Bebbington, J., Blasiak, R., Sobkowiak, M., & Folke, C. (2022) · Annual Review of Environment and Resources · doi:10.1146/annurev-environ-120120-052845 · Cited by 70
Metadata
- Authors
- Prakash, A., & Potoski, M.
- Venue
- Policy Studies Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-11
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 773-792
- ISSN
- 0190-292X (ISSN-L)
- 1541-0072
- OpenAlex
- W1526330077
- Cited by
- 252
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 14.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
