The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Absolute and Relative Biases in Estimations of Personal Risk1
Abstract
Two studies examined the accuracy of personal risk estimates, as determined by comparing mean estimates made by college students with population statistics for college‐educated individuals. Study 1 suggested that optimistic biases (the tendency for people to think they are less at risk than the average person) arise more because people overestimating the average person's risk than because they underestimate their own risk. In Study 2, subjects rated their risk after being presented with risk statistics that were 150%, 100%, or 50% of the true values. Subjects' estimates decreased with decreases in the comparison statistics, as if subjects attempted to preserve their “below‐average” status, but they changed less than did the statistics and were actually pessimistic in comparison to the 50% values. Implications for interventions designed to influence risk perceptions are discussed.
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Cites
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Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
Reyna, V. F., & Farley, F. (2006) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1111/j.1529-1006.2006.00026.x · Cited by 1,244
Metadata
- Authors
- Rothman, A. J., Klein, W. M., & Weinstein, N. D.
- Venue
- Journal of Applied Social Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1996-07
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 14
- Pages
- 1213-1236
- ISSN
- 0021-9029 (ISSN-L)
- 1559-1816
- OpenAlex
- W2009378154
- Cited by
- 234
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 24.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Rothman, A. J., Klein, W. M., & Weinstein, N. D. (1996). Absolute and Relative Biases in Estimations of Personal Risk1. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1996.tb01778.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.