The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Family CEOs vs. Nonfamily CEOs in the Family-Controlled Firm: An Examination of the Level and Sensitivity of Pay to Performance
Abstract
This study examines CEO compensation in 82 founding-family-controlled firms; 47 CEOs are members of the founding family and 35 are not. It tests the family incentive alignment hypothesis, which predicts that family CEOs have superior incentives for maximizing firm value and, therefore, need fewer compensation-based incentives. Univariate and multivariate analyses show that family CEOs' compensation levels are lower and that they receive less incentive-based pay—confirming the family incentive alignment hypothesis and suggesting the possible need for family firms to increase CEO compensation when they replace a founding family CEO with a nonfamily-member CEO.
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Citations
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- McConaughy, D. L.
- Venue
- Family Business Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2000-06
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 121-131
- ISSN
- 0894-4865 (ISSN-L)
- 1741-6248
- OpenAlex
- W2171033659
- Cited by
- 284
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 5.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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