The DOI matches its Crossref record; 70 of the 71 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Phenomenology of Agency
Abstract
Abstract This paper provides an overview of recent discussions of the phenomenology of agency. By ‘the phenomenology of agency’ I mean those phenomenal states that are associated with first‐person agency. I call such states ‘agentive experiences’. After briefly defending the claim that there is a phenomenology distinctive of first‐person agency, I focus on two questions: (i) What is the structure of agentive experience? (ii) What is the representational content of agentive experience? I conclude with a brief examination of how agentive experiences might be generated and what role they might play in the subject's cognitive economy.
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“That is, besides the sense of ownership, we also experience intentional movements as realisations of our agency (Bayne, 2008;Pacherie, 2008).”
From Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness (2013) · cites this paper as Bayne, 2008
Citations
Cites
Fodor, J. A. (1983) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001 · Cited by 7,734
Cummins, R., & Fodor, J. A. (1985) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2184717 · Cited by 4,791
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
Searle, J. R. (1983) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173452 · Cited by 4,575
Searle, J. R. (1983) · Cited by 2,418
Searle, J. R. (1983) · Cited by 2,418
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814594 · Cited by 2,249
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind
Tye, M. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6712.001.0001 · Cited by 1,718
The Illusion of Conscious Will
Wegner, D. M., Gilbert, D. T., & Wheatley, T. P. (2018) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262534925.001.0001 · Cited by 1,646
Central cancellation of self-produced tickle sensation
Blakemore, S.-J., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (1998) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/2870 · Cited by 1,467
The illusion of conscious will
Carruthers, P. (2007) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9204-7 · Cited by 1,361
Research works printed but not linked: 9
- Chisholm R., 1982, Free Will, 24
- Millikan R. G., 1996, Philosophical Perspectives IX, 185
- O’Connor T., 1995, Agents, Causes, Events, 173
- O'Shaughnessy B., 2003, Agency and Self‐Awareness, 345
- Preston J., 2005, On Building, Defending, and Regulating the Self, 103
- Roser M. E., 2006, The Evolution of Primate Nervous Systems, 503
- Siegel S., 2007, ‘Symposium on the Phenomenology of Agency’, Psyche, 13
- Wakefield J., 1991, John Searle and His Critics, 259
- Wegner D. M., 2005, The New Unconscious, 19
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness
Serino, A., Alsmith, A., Costantini, M., Mandrigin, A., Tajadura-Jimenez, A., & Lopez, C. (2013) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2013.08.013 · Cited by 259
Brown, C. J., Webb, T. L., Robinson, M. A., & Cotgreave, R. (2018) · Psychology of sport and exercise · doi:10.1016/j.psychsport.2018.01.003 · Cited by 142
Polito, V., Barnier, A. J., & Woody, E. Z. (2013) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2013.04.003 · Cited by 140
Narrators and comparators: the architecture of agentive self-awareness
Bayne, T., & Pacherie, É. (2007) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9239-9 · Cited by 111
Self-citationThe Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding
Bourget, D. (2015) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12208 · Cited by 93
Metadata
- Authors
- Bayne, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Oxford (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Bayne, Tim
- ORCID
- Bayne, Tim
- Venue
- Philosophy Compass
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-01
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 182-202
- ISSN
- 1747-9991 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1543341986
- Cited by
- 107
- References
- 71
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 5 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 1.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophy Compass (publishedVersion)
- Research Explorer (The University of Manchester) (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- phenomenology of agency, agency, representational content, structure of experience, cognitive economy, phenomenal states
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