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Cited by 259Virtual Reality Applications and ImpactsFree Will and AgencyEmbodied and Extended Cognition

Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness

Open access
Serino, Andrea, Alsmith, Adrian, Costantini, Marcello, Mandrigin, Alisa, Tajadura-Jimenez, Ana, Lopez, Christophe·2013·Consciousness and Cognition
DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2013.08.013
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Abstract

Recent research on bodily self-consciousness has assumed that it consists of three distinct components: the experience of owning a body (body ownership); the experience of being a body with a given location within the environment (self-location); and the experience of taking a first-person, body-centered, perspective on that environment (perspective). Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components-body ownership and self-location-are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction. We examine these results and consider them in relation to clinical evidence from patients with altered body perception and work on a variety of multisensory, body-related illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion, the full body illusion, the body swap illusion and the enfacement illusion. We conclude by providing a preliminary synthesis of the data on bodily self-consciousness and its neural correlates.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This review argues that bodily self-consciousness comprises at least two dissociable components—body ownership and self-location—with distinct neural correlates in ventral premotor/posterior parietal cortex and temporo-parietal junction, respectively. It synthesizes fMRI, clinical, and multisensory illusion evidence into a preliminary distributed model, while noting the model is not exhaustive and experimental double dissociation remains incomplete.

Key findings

  • Body ownership and self-location can be experimentally dissociated in one direction: the body swap illusion (Petkova et al., 2011) induced ownership for a mannequin without changing self-location, whereas the full body illusion (Ionta et al., 2011) altered self-location but also changed ownership, so only a single dissociation was experimentally demonstrated.
  • Neural correlates differed: Petkova et al. found vPMc and PPc activity during synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation, with vPMc activity correlated with illusory ownership; Ionta et al. found TPJ activity modulated by synchronous touch and varying with experienced self-location and visuo-spatial perspective, with no specific vPMc or PPc activation reported.
  • Clinical and rubber-hand-illusion evidence supports a double dissociation: out-of-body experiences and heautoscopy can show preserved self-identification/ownership with disturbed self-location; Rohde et al. dissociated proprioceptive drift from ownership ratings, and Longo et al.’s principal component analysis found ownership and location to be independent components. Blackmore (1984) found 24% of subjects reporting OBEs claimed a connection between their disembodied self and the seen body.
  • The paper focuses on the weaker claim that at least two components are distinct, and suggests the stronger three-component claim is false because perspective is not wholly distinct from self-location. It proposes a distributed model: unisensory body signals in SI/EBA, multisensory integration in PPc/vPMc/insula, and visual-tactile-proprioceptive-vestibular convergence at the TPJ for self-location and perspective.

Methods

  • Narrative review, not a primary study. It compares two fMRI adaptations of multisensory body illusions: Ionta et al. (2011), using touch on the back with a third-person virtual body, and Petkova et al. (2011), using touch on the chest with a first-person mannequin.
  • Integrates evidence from neuroimaging, monkey electrophysiology, TMS, lesion and clinical cases (out-of-body experiences, heautoscopy, somatoparaphrenia), and illusions including the rubber hand illusion, full body illusion, body swap illusion, out-of-body illusion, and enfacement illusion.
  • Main analysis is qualitative synthesis and proposal of a distributed neural model; no systematic search or meta-analysis is described.

Limitations

  • Stated: the model is not exhaustive and neglects at least three aspects—the body in movement and agency, peripersonal space and tool use, and social interaction.
  • Stated: experimental evidence for a double dissociation is incomplete; a change in self-location without any change in body ownership has not yet been produced experimentally, and this is left as an open question.
  • Evident: as a narrative review, conclusions are based on selected studies and are preliminary/tentative; no new data or formal quantitative synthesis are provided.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.concog.2013.08.013

Cites

147 of 147 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 128 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Interpretationcitation

    Visuo-tactile integration in the vPMc is critical for the experience of owning a body.

    “Taken together, they provide evidence that visuo-tactile integration in the vPMc appears critical for the experience of owning a body, whereas the integration of visual, tactile and vestibular signals at the TPJ reflects selflocation and visuo-spatial perspective.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Petkova et al., 2011 source

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    • The authors state this as an assumption: There are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.
  • Premisecitation

    In Petkova et al. (2011), neural activity in vPMc, but not PPc, was correlated with the strength of illusory ownership for the virtual body.

    “Neural activity in the vPMc, but not in the PPc, was correlated with the strength of illusory ownership for the virtual body, which was assessed by post-scan questionnaires.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Petkova et al., 2011 source

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  • Premisecitation

    In some instances (about one third of the population), disembodied self-location was associated with strong self-identification and some experience of ownership of the physical body.

    “However, in some instances (about one third of the population), the disembodied self-location was associated with strong self-identification and some experience of ownership of the physical body”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Green, 1968

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  • Interpretationcitation

    Clinical evidence and new research on the RHI supports the stronger claim of a double dissociation between body ownership and self-location.

    “Yet, clinical evidence and new research conducted on the RHI supports the stronger claim of a double dissociation.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Green, 1968

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    • cites Blackmore, 1984

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    • cites Devinsky et al., 1989 source

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    • The authors state this as an assumption: There are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.
  • Interpretationcitation

    Integration of visual, tactile and vestibular signals at the TPJ reflects self-location and visuo-spatial perspective.

    “Taken together, they provide evidence that visuo-tactile integration in the vPMc appears critical for the experience of owning a body, whereas the integration of visual, tactile and vestibular signals at the TPJ reflects selflocation and visuo-spatial perspective.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ionta et al., 2011 source

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    • The authors state this as an assumption: There are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.
  • May combine two claims. 39
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 14
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 1

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Body ownership and self-location are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located respectively in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction.

    “Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components-body ownership and self-location-are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Ionta et al., 2011 source

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    • cites Petkova et al., 2011 source

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    • The authors state this as an assumption: There are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In Ionta et al. (2011), participants reported a shift in bodily self from physical body to a spatial position closer to the virtual body, and some also reported a sense of ownership for the virtual body.

    “Participants in Ionta's study reported a feeling that their bodily self shifted from the space occupied by their physical body to a spatial position closer to where they saw the virtual body, and some participants also reported a sense of ownership for the virtual body.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ionta et al., 2011 source

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    Interpretationcitation

    While it is possible to alter the experience of owning a body without any shift in experienced self-location, it has not been shown experimentally that one can experience a change in self-location without a change in body ownership.

    “Therefore, while it is possible to alter the experience of owning a body without any shift in experienced self-location (Petkova et al., 2011), it has not been shown experimentally that one can experience a change in self-location without a change in body ownership.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Petkova et al., 2011 source

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    • The authors state this as an assumption: There are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    In Petkova et al. (2011), participants experienced ownership for a virtual body but did not modify their perceived self-location.

    “Petkova's manipulation resulted in a sense of ownership for the virtual body, but did not modify the perceived location of the self in space.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Petkova et al., 2011 source

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    Premisecitation

    During out-of-body experiences, most people report a loss of connection between the self and their physical body, suggesting concomitant changes of self-location and body ownership.

    “During out-of-body experiences most people report a loss of connection between the self and their physical body, suggesting concomitant changes of selflocation and body ownership (e.g.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Green, 1968

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  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Interpretationcitation

    Multisensory integration at the TPJ underlies the subjective feeling of being located within a body, occupying a given location in space, and experiencing the world from that location.

    “Accordingly, Ionta et al. (2011) claimed that multisensory integration at the TPJ underlies the subjective feeling of being located within a body, occupying a given location in space, and experiencing the world from that location.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ionta et al., 2011 source

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    Interpretationcitation

    A multisensory integration mechanism in the vPMc is responsible for the experience of a whole body as one's own.

    “Given the relationship between the activity in the vPMc and the subjective feeling of whole-body ownership, Petkova et al. claimed that a multisensory integration mechanism in the vPMc is responsible for the experience of a whole body as one's own.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Petkova et al., 2011 source

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    Premisecitation

    In Ionta et al. (2011), for participants who felt themselves looking upwards at the virtual body, estimated self-location was higher and TPJ activity was lower during synchronous compared with asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation; for participants who felt themselves at a lower location and looking downwards, estimated self-location was lower and TPJ activity was higher during synchronous versus

    “For participants who felt themselves to be looking upwards at the virtual body (up-group), the estimated self-location was higher and TPJ activity was lower during synchronous compared with asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation.For participants who felt themselves at a lower location and to be looking downwards, the estimated self-location was lower and TPJ activity was higher during synchronous”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ionta et al., 2011 source

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    Premisecitation

    The FBI (Ionta et al., 2011) does not induce the converse pattern; changes in self-location were accompanied by changes in body ownership and self-identification with the virtual body.

    “The FBI (Ionta et al., 2011) does not induce the converse pattern.Although the main aim of Ionta et al.'s study was to investigate the experience of self-location, they also induced some changes in body ownership, as shown by questionnaires and subjective reports”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ionta et al., 2011 source

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    Premisecitation

    In the body swap illusion (Petkova et al., 2011), body ownership is manipulated, whilst self-location is unaffected.

    “In the body swap illusion (Petkova et al., 2011), body ownership is manipulated, whilst self-location is unaffected.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Petkova et al., 2011 source

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    Interpretationreasoning

    Bodily self-consciousness is made up of, but is not limited to, two distinguishable components: body ownership and self-location.

    “We have argued that bodily self-consciousness is made up of, but is not limited to, two distinguishable components: body ownership and self-location.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Most heautoscopy patients report strong self-identification and affinity with the seen body while their sense of self-location is strongly disturbed.

    “Most patients report a strong selfidentification and affinity with the seen body while their sense of self-location is strongly disturbed (Heydrich & Blanke, 2013).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Heydrich & Blanke, 2013

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    Premisecitation

    In heautoscopy, ownership is usually experienced for the autoscopic body, but self-location is ambiguous and often alternates between the physical body and the autoscopic body.

    “Indeed, although ownership is usually experienced for the autoscopic (double) body, self-location is ambiguous and often alternates between the physical body and the autoscopic body.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Heydrich & Blanke, 2013

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  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Clinical evidence and recent work on the RHI suggest that body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness with distinct neural correlates.

    “Although a change in self-location without any change in ownership has not yet been produced experimentally, clinical evidence and recent work on the RHI suggest that the two are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness with distinct neural correlates.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The neural correlates of body ownership and self-location can be experimentally dissociated and identified, respectively, in the vPMc/PPc and in the TPJ.

    “In conclusion, there is accumulating evidence suggesting that body ownership and selflocation are distinct aspects of bodily self-consciousness, whose neural correlates can be experimentally dissociated and identified, respectively, in the vPMc/PPc and in the TPJ.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    A lesion to the somatosensory cortex results in hemianesthesia but does not induce disturbances in bodily experience per se.

    “For instance, a lesion to the somatosensory cortex results in hemianesthesia, i.e. a lack of tactile sensation from the controlesional side of the body, but it does not induce disturbances in bodily experience per se (Ronchi & Vallar, 2010).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ronchi & Vallar, 2010

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    Premisecitation

    The PPc and vPMc are largely interconnected but may still have partially dissociable functions.

    “These regions are largely interconnected (Koch et al., 2010;Matelli & Luppino, 2001), but may still have partially dissociable functions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Koch et al., 2010 source

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    • cites Matelli & Luppino, 2001

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    Premisecitation

    Usually lesions to unisensory cortices induce sensory specific deficits, but do not induce disturbances in bodily experience.

    “First of all, usually lesions to unisensory cortices induce sensory specific deficits, but do not induce disturbances in bodily experience.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Ronchi & Vallar, 2010

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    Premisecitation

    Patients with PPc lesions are strongly impaired when performing tasks requiring on-line coding of body posture, when attending to body parts on the left in the case of a right lesion, and when describing the spatial relations between body parts in the case of a left lesion.

    “Patients with PPc lesions are strongly impaired when performing tasks requiring on-line coding of body posture (Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005), when attending to body parts on the left in the case of a right lesion (i.e.personal neglect; Committeri et al., 2007) and when describing the spatial relations between body parts in the case of a left lesion (i.e.autotopagnosia; Ogden, 1985).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005

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    • cites Committeri et al., 2007 source

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    • cites Ogden, 1985 source

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    Premisecitation

    The RHI is not induced (or is much weaker) when visuo-tactile stimulation is applied to a non-corporeal object or when the rubber hand is placed in a position that is anatomically incompatible with the subject's posture.

    “However, this does not normally occur, since the RHI is not induced (or it is much weaker) when visuo-tactile stimulation is applied to a non-corporeal object (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003;Haans, Ijsselsteijn, & de Kort, 2008;Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Fotopoulou, 2010;Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) or when the rubber hand is placed in a position that is anatomically incompatible with the subject's”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Armel & Ramachandran, 2003 source

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    • cites Haans et al., 2008 source

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    • cites Tsakiris et al., 2010

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

    Interpretationcitation

    This mechanism might trigger an experience of ownership for the 'other' body, without vPMc activation actually underpinning the experience of ownership.

    “This mechanism might trigger an experience of ownership for the”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Tsakiris, 2010

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    • cites Tsakiris et al., 2006 source

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    Premisecitation

    The posterior insula has primarily been involved in interoceptive representations of the body, and the anterior insula has primarily been involved in integrating bodily signals with environmental, emotional and motivational representations.

    “The posterior insula has primarily been involved in interoceptive representations of the body (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004), and the anterior insula has primarily been involved in integrating bodily signals with environmental, emotional and motivational representations (Berlucchi & Aglioti, 2010;Craig, 2009).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Critchley et al., 2004 source

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    • cites Berlucchi & Aglioti, 2010

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    • cites Craig, 2009 source

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    Premisecitation

    TMS applied over the TPJ facilitates the experience of ownership for non-corporeal objects, suggesting that interfering with sensory processing at the TPJ can disrupt the test-for-fit processes and increases the likelihood of self-attributing non-corporeal objects into one's body schema.

    “Indeed, TMS applied over the TPJ facilitates the experience of ownership for non-corporeal objects, suggesting that interfering with sensory processing at the TPJ can disrupt the test-for-fit processes and increases the likelihood of selfattributing non-corporeal objects into one's body schema (Tsakiris, Costantini, & Haggard, 2008).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Tsakiris et al., 2008 source

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  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Although multisensory integration at the vPMc might be necessary for the induction of an illusion of body ownership, the experience of ownership might result from activation elsewhere.

    “Nevertheless, although multisensory integration at the vPMc might be necessary for the induction of an illusion of body ownership, the experience of ownership might result from activation elsewhere (see below).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Activation of the vPMc has been related to the induction of the RHI and the body swap illusion: vPMc activity increases during synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation and is correlated with questionnaire responses.

    “As noted above, activation of the vPMc has been related to the induction of the RHI (Ehrsson et al., 2005;Ehrsson et al., 2004) and the body swap illusion (Petkova et al., 2011): vPMc activity increases during synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation (in particular at the beginning of the illusion) and is correlated with questionnaire responses.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Ehrsson et al., 2005 source

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    • cites Ehrsson et al., 2004 source

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    • cites Petkova et al., 2011 source

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    These test-for-fit processes are computed in the right TPJ, a region that could harbour a structural model of the body.

    “According to Tsakiris, these test-for-fit processes would be computed in the right TPJ, a region that could harbour a structural model of the body.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Tsakiris, 2010

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    Premisecitation

    TPJ activity is necessary for computing self-location and visuo-spatial perspective, because it receives converging visual, tactile, proprioceptive and vestibular signals about body orientation with respect to the environment.

    “As documented above, TPJ activity is necessary for computing self-location and visuo-spatial perspective, because it receives converging visual, tactile, proprioceptive and vestibular signals about body orientation with respect to the environment (Blanke & Arzy, 2005;Bottini et al., 2001;Lopez et al., 2008).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Blanke & Arzy, 2005

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    • cites Bottini et al., 2001 source

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    • cites Lopez et al., 2008 source

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  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Subjects with high interoceptive awareness (linked to insula function) are less ready to experience ownership for other stimuli, probably because they have a stronger sense of ownership for their own body.

    “This result suggests that subjects with high interoceptive awareness (linked to insula function) are less ready to experience ownership for other stimuli, probably because they have a stronger sense of ownership for their own body.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The body is experienced as occupying a given location in the world and as being the locus of one's perceptual perspective.

    “Finally, the body is experienced as occupying a given location in the world and as being the locus of one's perceptual perspective.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The insula also underpins bodily self-consciousness during the RHI because activation of the right insula was positively correlated with the strength of the RHI.

    “A PET study by Tsakiris and colleagues (Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007) suggests that the insula also underpins bodily selfconsciousness during the RHI because activation of the right insula was positively correlated with the strength of the RHI.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Tsakiris et al., 2007 source

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    Premisereasoning

    We experience ourselves as occupying a given location in the world with a given perspective.

    “We not only experience our bodies as our own, we also experience ourselves as occupying a given location in the world with a given perspective.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The vPMc contains neural populations which integrate multisensory cues (visual, tactile, auditory) among different body parts and are responsive when participants experience a part of their body or their whole body as their own.

    “In particular, the vPMc contains neural populations which integrate multisensory cues (visual, tactile, auditory) among different body parts and are responsive when participants experience a part of their body or their whole body as their own.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Two sources of information seem critical for self-location: vestibular signals that code the orientation and movement of the body with respect to gravity, and visual signals related to external objects, which code the orientation and movement of the body with respect to the environment.

    “Two sources of information seem critical for this: vestibular signals that code the orientation and movement of the body with respect to gravity, and visual signals related to external objects, which code the orientation and movement of the body with respect to the environment.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Bodily self-consciousness comprises the concurrent experience of (a) a body as one's own, and (b) this body as located in space.

    “In summary, bodily self-consciousness comprises the concurrent experience of (a) a body as one's own, and (b) this body as located in space.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Body self-consciousness ought to include a mechanism that continuously maps on-line where the different body parts are in space and in relationship to each other.

    “On the other hand, body self-consciousness ought to include a mechanism that continuously maps on-line where the different body parts are in space and in relationship to each other.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Such a process is probably implemented in the PPc because this area contains neural populations which respond to multisensory information as referenced to single body parts, and also transforms these body-part-centered signals in common reference frames.

    “Such a process is probably implemented in the PPc because this area contains neural populations which respond to multisensory information as referenced to single body parts, and also transforms these body-part-centered signals in common reference frames.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    The experience of self-location seems a minimally necessary condition for self-consciousness, and also for awareness of external events.

    “In this sense, the experience of self-location seems a minimally necessary condition for self-consciousness (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009), and also for awareness of external events.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Blanke & Metzinger, 2009 source

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The present model is not exhaustive, as it neglects at least two fundamental aspects of bodily experience.

    “We are aware that the present model is not exhaustive, as it neglects at least two fundamental aspects of bodily experience.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Work on bodily self-consciousness has typically relied on several assumptions.

    “Moreover, work on bodily self-consciousness has typically relied on several assumptions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    It is possible that social interactions shape the experience we have of our body.

    “The body is our interface with others (see e.g., Adolphs, 2009;Decety & Lamm, 2007;Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004;Saxe, 2006), and therefore it is possible that social interactions shape the experience we have of our body (Ambrosini, Blomberg, Mandrigin, & Costantini, 2013;Cardellicchio, Sinigaglia, & Costantini, 2012;Cardini, Tajadura-Jimenez, Serino, & Tsakiris, 2012;Costantini, Ambrosini,”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Adolphs, 2009 source

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    • cites Decety & Lamm, 2007

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    • cites Gallese et al., 2004 source

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  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The different levels of body representations reviewed here need to be integrated with other systems in order to support the motor and social functions of human cognitive systems.

    “Thus, the different levels of body representations we reviewed here need to be integrated with other systems in order to support the motor and social functions of human cognitive systems.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Interoceptive and emotional signals are processed in the insular, constituting another fundamental component of self-awareness.

    “Concurrently, interoceptive and emotional signals are processed in the insular, constituting another fundamental component of self-awareness.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The notion of a distributed representation of the body might resemble the concept of the 'neuromatrix' by Melzack, who proposed that bodily experience results from the interaction of several nodes of interconnected brain areas.

    “The notion of a distributed representation of the body might resemble the concept of the”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites Melzack, 1990 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Body-related signals are integrated with information pertaining to external stimuli occurring in the space near the body to constitute a multisensory representation of peripersonal space.

    “An extensive literature has shown that body-related signals are integrated with information pertaining to external stimuli occurring in the space near the body to constitute a multisensory representation of peripersonal space (Graziano & Cooke, 2006;Ladavas, 2002;Rizzolatti et al., 1997).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Graziano & Cooke, 2006 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Ladavas, 2002 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Rizzolatti et al., 1997 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Multisensory integration mechanisms concur with experience of the body as a whole and experience of the body as one's own.

    “Such multisensory integration mechanisms concur with experience of the body as a whole and experience of the body as one's own.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Body representations interface with the motor system and with the executive system, representing actions and goals.

    “More moderately, it is clear that body representations interface with the motor system and with the executive system, representing actions and goals (Andersen & Buneo, 2002;Dorris & Glimcher, 2004).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Andersen & Buneo, 2002 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Dorris & Glimcher, 2004

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Using tools to interact with objects in the environment both shapes peripersonal space representation and alters the perception of the body itself.

    “A prominent line of research has shown that using tools to interact with objects in the environment both shapes peripersonal space representation (see Ladavas & Serino, 2008;Maravita & Iriki, 2004 for reviews) and alters the perception of the body itself (Canzoneri et al., 2013;Cardinali et al., 2009;Longo & Serino, 2012 for comments).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites Ladavas & Serino, 2008

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Maravita & Iriki, 2004 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Canzoneri et al., 2013 source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Taken together the processes listed above constitute a multi-componential model underlying the experience of the bodily self, in which the different components are processed by distinguishable, interacting, neural systems.

    “Taken together the processes listed above constitute a multi-componential model underlying the experience of the bodily self, in which the different components are processed by distinguishable, interacting, neural systems.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • The authors state this as an assumption: Body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Body representations as well as space representations are not simply sensory or motor, but rather both sensory and motor.

    “A long tradition in neuroscience supports the view that body representations as well as space representations are not simply sensory or motor, but rather both sensory and motor (Rizzolatti et al., 1997;Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2002).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked
    • cites Rizzolatti et al., 1997 source

      Not checked in the free run.

    • cites Rizzolatti et al., 2002 source

      Not checked in the free run.

49 of 49

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Bodily self-consciousness comprises at least three distinct components: body ownership, self-location, and perspective.

    “Our aim in the following discussion is to provide some degree of validation for a third assumption driving this research, namely that bodily self-consciousness comprises at least three distinct components: the experience of owning a body (body ownership); the experience of being a body with a given location within our environment (self-location); and the experience of taking a first-person, body-”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    There are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.

    “Our discussion will focus on a weaker form of the assumption: that there are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The behavioural effects of manipulating proprioceptive, interoceptive and exteroceptive signals can serve as implicit measures of phenomena described in explicit reports of subjective experience.

    “The first is that the behavioural effects of manipulating proprioceptive, interoceptive and exteroceptive signals can serve as implicit measures of phenomena described in explicit reports of subjective experience.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Global aspects of bodily self-consciousness can be studied by manipulating these sensory signals, despite the fact that their immediate processing is physiologically and computationally constrained to individual body parts.

    “The second is that global aspects of bodily self-consciousness (pertaining to the experience of the body as a whole) can be studied by manipulating these sensory signals, despite the fact that their immediate processing is physiologically and computationally constrained to individual body parts”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness.

    “This cumulative evidence supports the (weaker) assumption that has driven research into bodily selfconsciousness-that body ownership and self-location are distinct components of the experience of oneself as a bodily subject.”
    “we have made a case in support of one of these assumptions: that body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily selfconsciousness.”
5 of 5

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • In experiment 3, there was no memory improvement in the object condition, arguing against a visual or attentional account and corroborating that the recognition enhancement is due to multisensory-motor bodily stimulation.

    “Data from this experiment revealed no memory improvement in the object condition, arguing against a visual or attentional account and further corroborating our proposal that the present recognition enhancement is due to multisensory-motor bodily stimulation that has been shown to be crucial for BSC [36,42,49,133] and characteristic of normal everyday experience.”

    From First-person view of one’s body in immersive virtual reality: Influence on episodic memory (2019) · cites this paper as [133]

  • The FBI effects were more weakly induced during asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation.

    “In line with previous findings, these effects were more weakly induced during asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation (see Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Blanke et al., 2012; Serino et al., 2013).”

    From Peripersonal space as the space of the bodily self (2015) · cites this paper as Serino et al., 2013

  • The effect depends on a shift of multisensory receptive fields of PPS neurons.

    “We suggest that this effect depends on a shift of multisensory receptive fields of PPS neurons (Blanke, 2012; Ehrsson et al., 2012; Serino et al., 2013), although we acknowledge that the present data cannot provide neurophysiological evidence to such a proposal.”

    From Peripersonal space as the space of the bodily self (2015) · cites this paper as Serino et al., 2013

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

3 of the 150 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Blackmore, 1984, A postal survey of OBEs and other experiences, Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, 52, 225
  2. Makin, 2008, On the other hand: Dummy hands and peripersonal space, Behavioural Brain Research, 191, 1, 10.1016/j.bbr.2008.02.041 · DOI · Paper page

Cited by

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Related

Authors
Serino, A., Alsmith, A., Costantini, M., Mandrigin, A., Tajadura-Jimenez, A., & Lopez, C.
Affiliations
  • École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (CH)
  • University of Copenhagen (DK)
  • University of Chieti-Pescara (IT)
  • University of Edinburgh (GB)
Corresponding author
Serino, Andrea
ORCID
Venue
Consciousness and Cognition
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2013-12
Volume
22
Issue
4
Pages
1239-1252
ISSN
1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.concog.2013.08.013
OpenAlex
W2079829150
Semantic Scholar
5ffb77377a192ce233cdb37fdb89dcbc2a5c68a0
Cited by
259
References
150
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 24 · 2014: 9
FWCI
5.56
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick) (acceptedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
  • Stirling Online Research Repository (University of Stirling) (submittedVersion)
  • Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
  • Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) (submittedVersion)
  • Research at the University of Copenhagen (University of Copenhagen) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Volkswagen Foundation
  • Economic and Social Research Council (ES/K001477/1)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
bodily self-consciousness, body ownership, self-localization, first-person perspective, premotor cortex, temporoparietal junction, multisensory illusions, rubber hand illusion, full-body illusion, enfacement illusion, neural correlates
MeSH terms
Body Image, Humans, Illusions, Motor Cortex, Parietal Lobe, Proprioception, Self Concept, Space Perception, Temporal Lobe

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-09.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-09.

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