Introspecting Phenomenal States
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention done. This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non‐causal. DA nicely explains key intuitions about phenomenal self‐knowledge, makes possible an appealing diagnosis of blindsight cases, and yields a highly plausible view as to the extent of our first‐person epistemic privilege. Because these virtues stem from construing phenomenal properties as non‐relational features of states, my defense of DA constitutes a challenge to relational construals of phenomenal properties, including functionalism and representationalism. And I provide reason to doubt that they can meet this challenge.
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Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364
Jackson, F. (1982) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2960077 · Cited by 2,477
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind
Tye, M. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6712.001.0001 · Cited by 1,718
Rosenthal, D. M. (1986) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00355521 · Cited by 1,019
Cited by
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection
Schwitzgebel, E. (2008) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-037 · Cited by 658
The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief
Chalmers, D. J. (2003) · Consciousness · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.003.0009 · Cited by 383
Panpsychism and Russellian Monism
Alter, T., & Coleman, S. (2019) · The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism · doi:10.4324/9781315717708-20 · Cited by 27
Metadata
- Authors
- GERTLER, B.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001-09
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 305-328
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W2048902321
- Cited by
- 201
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 2.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.