The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Higher‐Order Evidence1
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.
Kornblith, H., & Pollock, J. (1988) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2108001 · Cited by 1,152
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News
Christensen, D. (2007) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-035 · Cited by 970
Self-citationElga, A. (2007) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00656.x · Cited by 660
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
Kelly, T. (2005) · Oxford Studies In Epistemology · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199285891.003.0007 · Cited by 598
Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence
Kelly, T. (2010) · Disagreement · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0007 · Cited by 544
Does Murphy’s Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals
Christensen, D. (2007) · Oxford Studies In Epistemology · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199237067.003.0001 · Cited by 215
Self-citationFeldman, R. (2005) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00055.x · Cited by 201
Apriority as an Evaluative Notion
Field, H. H. (2000) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/0199241279.003.0006 · Cited by 192
Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection
Arntzenius, F. (2016) · Readings in Formal Epistemology · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_10 · Cited by 161
Feldman, R., & Warfield, T. A. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001 · Cited by 130
Cited by
YOU JUST BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE…1
White, R. (2010) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00204.x · Cited by 269
Dorst, K. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3918498 · Cited by 108
De Cruz, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108557849 · Cited by 24
ON THE SUPPOSED DILEMMA OF CONCILIATIONISM
Reining, S. (2016) · Episteme · doi:10.1017/epi.2015.47 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- CHRISTENSEN, D.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-06-30
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 185-215
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W1844574851
- Cited by
- 385
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 98.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Higher‐Order Evidence1. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00366.x
- The paper
- CHRISTENSEN, D. (2010). Higher‐Order Evidence1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00366.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
