The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence
Open accessAbstract
This chapter distinguishes and assesses a set of views about the rational response to peer disagreement. It raises a series of objections to views according to which one should assign ‘equal weight’ to one's own view and the views of those with which one disagrees. It concludes by defending ‘The Total Evidence View’, according to which what one is justified in believing in cases of peer disagreement depends upon what is supported by one's total evidence.
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Cites
Williamson, T. (2002) · doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001 · Cited by 2,788
Williamson, T. (2007) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470696675 · Cited by 2,277
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News
Christensen, D. (2007) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-035 · Cited by 970
Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?
GOLDMAN, A. I. (2001) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00093.x · Cited by 911
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
Pryor, J. (2004) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x · Cited by 705
Wedgwood, R. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001 · Cited by 683
Elga, A. (2007) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00656.x · Cited by 660
Sosa, E. (2007) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.001.0001 · Cited by 614
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
Kelly, T. (2005) · Oxford Studies In Epistemology · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199285891.003.0007 · Cited by 598
Self-citationIf You're an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?
COHEN, G. A. (2009) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvjz82m8 · Cited by 281
Cited by
On the ethics of algorithmic decision-making in healthcare
Grote, T., & Berens, P. (2020) · Journal of Medical Ethics · doi:10.1136/medethics-2019-105586 · Cited by 551
The Importance of Being Rational
Lord, E. (2018) · Oxford Scholarship Online · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198815099.001.0001 · Cited by 474
Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy
Christensen, D. (2009) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x · Cited by 431
CHRISTENSEN, D. (2010) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00366.x · Cited by 385
YOU JUST BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE…1
White, R. (2010) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00204.x · Cited by 269
Metadata
- Authors
- Kelly, T.
- Venue
- Disagreement
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2010-08-05
- Pages
- 111-174
- OpenAlex
- W2336005475
- Cited by
- 544
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 288.05
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.