The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News
Open accessAbstract
We all live out our lives in states of epistemic imperfection.Most obviously, this is true because the evidence on which we base our beliefs is limited.Only a little less obviously, we live in states of epistemic imperfection because we do not always respond to the evidence we have in the best way.Given that our epistemic condition consists in imperfect responses to incomplete evidence, part of being rational involves taking account of these sources of imperfection.Fortunately, each of us is confronted every day by opportunities for epistemic selfimprovement.Most frequently, opportunity arrives in the form of evidence that bears directly on the subject-matters of our beliefs: hearing the evening weather report, I can revise upward my confidence that it will rain tomorrow.Other opportunities for epistemic self-improvement address not our deficits in evidence, but our deficits in responding to the evidence: reading a 1 This paper was read in the Fall 2004 at Princeton University, and I'd like to thank the audience at that talk for stimulating discussion.I'd also like to thank the following people for
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Cites
Plantinga, A. (2000) · doi:10.1093/0195131932.001.0001 · Cited by 1,291
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
Kelly, T. (2005) · Oxford Studies In Epistemology · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199285891.003.0007 · Cited by 598
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On the ethics of algorithmic decision-making in healthcare
Grote, T., & Berens, P. (2020) · Journal of Medical Ethics · doi:10.1136/medethics-2019-105586 · Cited by 551
Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence
Kelly, T. (2010) · Disagreement · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.003.0007 · Cited by 544
Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy
Christensen, D. (2009) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00237.x · Cited by 431
Self-citationCHRISTENSEN, D. (2010) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00366.x · Cited by 385
Self-citationYOU JUST BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE…1
White, R. (2010) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00204.x · Cited by 269
Metadata
- Authors
- Christensen, D.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- Duke University Press
- Published
- 2007-04-01
- Volume
- 116
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 187-217
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-1470
- OpenAlex
- W1976479981
- Cited by
- 970
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 200.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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