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Understanding intention in normal development and in autism

Phillips, Wendy, Baron‐Cohen, Simon, Rutter, Michael · 1998 · British Journal of Developmental Psychology
Cited by 146

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

This study aimed to establish whether or not young children and young people with autism can understand the mental state of intention. Participants were exposed to personal experience of unintended outcomes, to test if they could distinguish intended vs. unintended actions. Recognizing accidental outcomes was more difficult for normal 4‐year‐olds than 5‐year‐olds, and more difficult for young people with autism, compared with comparison groups. Such findings suggest that the theory of mind deficit observed in people with autism is not restricted to understanding epistemic states, but also extends to understanding intention. The results are also compatible with an action‐monitoring deficit. Future research needs to test these two accounts against each other., 15 April 1996, 9 October 1997

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.2044-835x.1998.tb00756.x

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Metadata

Authors
Phillips, W., Baron‐Cohen, S., & Rutter, M.
Venue
British Journal of Developmental Psychology
Publisher
Wiley
Published
1998-09
Volume
16
Issue
3
Pages
337-348
ISSN
  • 0261-510X (ISSN-L)
  • 2044-835X
OpenAlex
W2124228811
Cited by
146
References
5
FWCI
7.76
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Understanding intention in normal development and in autism. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.2044-835x.1998.tb00756.x
The paper
Phillips, W., Baron‐Cohen, S., & Rutter, M. (1998). Understanding intention in normal development and in autism. British Journal of Developmental Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835x.1998.tb00756.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.