When Does a Platform Create Value by Limiting Choice?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We present a theory for why it might be rational for a platform to limit the number of applications available on it. Our model is based on the observation that even if users prefer application variety, applications often also exhibit direct network effects. When there are direct network effects, users prefer to consume the same applications to benefit from consumption complementarities. We show that the combination of preference for variety and consumption complementarities gives rise to (i) a commons problem (to better satisfy their individual preference for variety, users have an incentive to consume more applications than the number that maximizes joint utility); (ii) an equilibrium selection problem (consumption complementarities often lead to multiple equilibria, which result in different utility levels for the users); and (iii) a coordination problem (lacking perfect foresight, it is unlikely that users will end up buying the same set of applications). The analysis shows that the platform can resolve these problems and create value by limiting the number of applications available. By limiting choice, the platform may create new equilibria (including the allocation that maximizes users' utility); eliminate equilibria that give lower utility to the users; and reduce the severity of the coordination problem faced by users.
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Citations
Cites
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 · Cited by 5,642 · cited 3×
“Rochet and Tirole (2003), for example, is inspired by the credit card industry; Armstrong (2006) captures well the economics of newspapers; and Hagiu (2009) considers competition between video game systems.”
Competition in two-sided markets
Armstrong, M. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x · Cited by 3,315
Two-sided markets: A progress report
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x · Cited by 2,994
Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers
Caillaud, B., & Jullien, B. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593720 · Cited by 1,799 · cited 1×
“Likewise, Caillaud and Jullien (2003) considers the impact of matching technology on platform competition.”
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?
Ellison, G., & Fudenberg, D. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303322552793 · Cited by 156
Cited by
Boudreau, K. J. (2012) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1110.0678 · Cited by 676
Understanding platform business models: A mixed methods study of marketplaces
Täuscher, K., & Laudien, S. M. (2018) · European Management Journal · doi:10.1016/j.emj.2017.06.005 · Cited by 604
Global platforms and ecosystems: Implications for international business theories
Nambisan, S., Zahra, S. A., & Luo, Y. (2019) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-019-00262-4 · Cited by 587
Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com
Zhu, F., & Liu, Q. (2018) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2932 · Cited by 546
Platform Competition: A Systematic and Interdisciplinary Review of the Literature
Rietveld, J., & Schilling, M. A. (2021) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206320969791 · Cited by 504
Metadata
- Authors
- Casadesus‐Masanell, R., & Hałaburda, H.
- Venue
- Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2014-04-04
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 259-293
- ISSN
- 1058-6407 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9134
- OpenAlex
- W3123702431
- Cited by
- 71
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 10.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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